![Georgia / 17 March 2003 / Georgia, საქართველოს უზენაესი სასამართლო (Supreme Court of Georgia) / The Kiev […] Institute v. “M”, Scientific-Industrial Technological Institute of Tbilisi / 3a-17-02](./images/case-law.png)
Georgia / 17 March 2003 / Georgia, საქართველოს უზენაესი სასამართლო (Supreme Court of Georgia) / The Kiev […] Institute v. “M”, Scientific-Industrial Technological Institute of Tbilisi / 3a-17-02
| Country | Georgia |
| Court | Georgia, საქართველოს უზენაესი სასამართლო (Supreme Court of Georgia) |
| Date | 17 March 2003 |
| Parties | The Kiev […] Institute v. “M”, Scientific-Industrial Technological Institute of Tbilisi |
| Case number | 3a-17-02 |
| Applicable NYC Provisions | V | V(1)(b) |
| Source |
http://prg.supremecourt.ge (website of the Supreme Court of Georgia) |
| Languages | English |
| Summary | On 25 September 1998, the Kiev […] Institute (the “Institute”) entered into a contract with the Scientific-Industrial Technological Institute of Tbilisi (“M”) to perform works to remove unauthorized construction in a residential building in Tbilisi. The Institute filed a claim against M before the Kiev Arbitration Court, seeking payment of sums outstanding under the contract. The Institute obtained a favorable award, which it sought to have recognized and enforced in Georgia before the Supreme Court of Georgia. M opposed enforcement of the arbitral award, arguing that it had not been given an opportunity to participate in the arbitration proceedings and had been deprived of the right to be heard. The Supreme Court of Georgia left the application for recognition and enforcement without consideration. Relying on Article V(1)(b) NYC and the Private International Law of Georgia, it held that there was insufficient evidence to show that M had been informed of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings, and whether it had been duly served notice of the hearing. The Supreme Court noted that even upon its request to the Kiev Arbitration Court and the Institute, seeking evidence of the service of notice to M, the Kiev Arbitration Court was only able to state that the notice had been sent, but not whether it had been served upon M. The Supreme Court held that procedural violations must not place the parties in an unequal position and that equality of the parties is a fundamental procedural principle, which means that each party has to be given an opportunity to present its case. It found that not notifying a party of the proceedings constitutes a violation of that party’s procedural rights. On this basis, the Supreme Court refused to grant recognition and enforcement of the award. However, it held that it would be open for the Institute to resubmit a request for recognition and enforcement of the award should it obtain evidence establishing that M had been informed, in accordance with the applicable law, of the appointment of the arbitrator, the arbitration proceedings, and the hearing. |
Attachment (2)
 Original Language Adobe Acrobat PDF |
Unofficial Translation Adobe Acrobat PDF |
