United States / 06 January 2011 / United States, U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit / Dedon GMBH and Dedon Inc. v. Janus et CIE / 10–4331
Country | United States |
Court | United States, U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit |
Date | 06 January 2011 |
Parties | Dedon GMBH and Dedon Inc. v. Janus et CIE |
Case number | 10–4331 |
Applicable NYC Provisions | II | II(3) |
Source | online: http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/ (official website of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit) |
Languages | English |
Summary | The Plaintiffs-Appellees, Dedon GMBH and Dedon Inc. (collectively, “Dedon”) sued the Defendant-Appellant, Janus et Cie (“Janus”), in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking, inter alia, declaratory relief that the parties had not entered into a distribution agreement. Janus moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the parties were bound to arbitrate their disputes, including the issue of whether the arbitrators had jurisdiction to decide the dispute, pursuant to an arbitration agreement contained in a distribution agreement the parties had been negotiating. The District Court refused to compel arbitration without first determining whether the parties had entered into a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement. It also held that Dedon had not waived its right to object to arbitration in court by asking the Court of Arbitration at the International Chamber of Commerce (the “ICC Court”) to determine prima facie that the parties had not entered into an arbitration agreement. Janus appealed, arguing that the District Court had erred in refusing to compel arbitration of the question of the existence of the distribution agreement and in finding that Dedon had not waived its right to object to arbitration before the court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. It held that a court should order arbitration of a dispute only where it is satisfied that neither the formation of the parties’ arbitration agreement nor its enforceability or applicability to the dispute is at issue. Since Dedon contested the existence of the agreement containing the arbitration provision, the Court held that Dedon could not be compelled to arbitration without that issue first being resolved. The Court held that Dedon, by requesting the ICC Court to determine, on a prima facie basis, whether an arbitration agreement existed, had not waived its right to object to arbitration or to have the issue of arbitrability decided by a court. The Court reasoned that by repeatedly objecting to arbitration at every opportunity, Dedon had preserved its right to have a court determine whether it was obligated to arbitrate its claims against Janus. |
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