United States / 10 September 2012 / United States, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York / Travelport Global Distribution Systems B.V. v. Bellview Airlines Limited / 12 Civ. 3483(DLC)
| Country | United States |
| Court | United States, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York |
| Date | 10 September 2012 |
| Parties | Travelport Global Distribution Systems B.V. v. Bellview Airlines Limited |
| Case number | 12 Civ. 3483(DLC) |
| Applicable NYC Provisions | VII | II | I | II(3) | I(1) | VII(1) |
| Source |
online: PACER |
| Languages | English |
| Summary | The Petitioner, Travelport Global Distribution Systems B.V. (“Travelport”), and the Respondent, Bellview Airlines Limited (“Bellview”), entered into a Distribution Agreement for the provision of goods and services in Nigeria. The Distribution Agreement provided for arbitration in the U.S. under New York law, pursuant to the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), but designated a non-existent arbitral body to administer the proceedings. After a dispute arose, Bellview initiated an action in the Federal High Court of Nigeria seeking a declaration that a dispute had arisen between the parties and that Bellview was entitled to refer the dispute to arbitration. However, subsequently, Bellview objected to arbitration, and Travelport filed motions in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to compel arbitration and enjoin litigation in Nigeria. Bellview argued that the arbitration agreement was “incapable of being performed” because it designated a non-existent arbitral body. It argued that alternatively, the use of the word “may” in the arbitration agreement meant that arbitration was permissive rather than mandatory. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York compelled arbitration pursuant to the Distribution Agreement and issued an anti-suit injunction. The Court determined that the arbitration agreement was governed by the NYC, which was implemented in Chapter Two of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), and by Chapter One of the FAA, which governed domestic arbitration, because it required arbitration in the United States. Asserting that it was for the Court to determine questions of arbitrability by applying state-law contract principles, the Court concluded that the agreement required arbitration notwithstanding the use of the word “may”. The Court also held that where the overriding intent of the parties was to settle disputes through arbitration, selecting a non-existent arbitral institution did not render the arbitration agreement inoperable. The Court dismissed Bellview’s defenses based on a lack of jurisdiction, improper venue and waiver of right to compel arbitration. Finally, in enjoining litigation in Nigeria, the Court reasoned, based on the requirements for the issuance anti-suit of injunctions, that (i) the parties were identical in both proceedings and (ii) the issues pending before the Nigerian court were dispositive of the issues in the present case. In addition it reasoned that a failure to prevent litigation in Nigeria would cause delay, inconsistent rulings and a race to judgment. |
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Attachment (1)
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