United Kingdom / 07 March 2011 / England and Wales, Court of Appeal / TXM Olaj-ES Gazkutato KTF v. Claxton Engineering Services / A3/2010/2688 & A3/2011/0424
Country | United Kingdom |
Court | England and Wales, Court of Appeal |
Date | 07 March 2011 |
Parties | TXM Olaj-ES Gazkutato KTF v. Claxton Engineering Services |
Case number | A3/2010/2688 & A3/2011/0424 |
Applicable NYC Provisions | II | II(3) |
Source |
[2011] EWCA Civ 410 | online: BAILII |
Languages | English |
Summary | Claxton Engineering Services Ltd (“Claxton”) contracted with TXM Olaj-ES Gazkutato KFT (“TXM”) for the manufacture and sale of oil well equipment. A dispute arose and Claxton initiated proceedings before the English High Court. TXM sought a stay of the proceedings under section 9 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (U.K.) (“the Act”) (providing that the court shall, on an application by a party to an arbitration agreement against whom legal proceedings are brought in respect of a matter which, under the agreement, is to be referred to arbitration, stay the proceedings so far as they concern that matter, unless it is satisfied that the agreement is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed) (c.f. Article II(3) NYC). TXM submitted that the parties had agreed to refer any dispute arising out of the parties’ contract to arbitration in Hungary. Claxton denied that any such agreement had been made and sought to invoke a clause in the contract bestowing exclusive jurisdiction on the English courts. The Court found in favour of Claxton and refused the stay. After the Court had handed down its judgment, TXM proceeded to bring arbitral proceedings before the Court of Arbitration attached to the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Claxton thereupon applied to the High Court for an injunction enjoining TXM from pursuing the arbitral proceedings, which was granted. TXM sought leave to appeal both the decision denying the existence of an arbitration agreement and refusing the stay and the decision granting the injunction. It submitted, inter alia, that it was contrary to the philosophy of arbitration under the Act and the NYC, as well as the principle of compétence-compétence, for the Court to have looked beyond whether there was an arguable case for an arbitration agreement. The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal both decisions, holding, inter alia, that the High Court had erred in proceeding to determine whether there was a binding arbitration agreement and that it ought to have left that question to the arbitrators, in keeping with the principle of compétence-compétence. |
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