United Kingdom / 27 June 2012 / England and Wales, Court of Appeal / Yukos Capital S.à r.L. v. OJSC Rosneft Oil Company / A3/2011/1790
Country | United Kingdom |
Court | England and Wales, Court of Appeal |
Date | 27 June 2012 |
Parties | Yukos Capital S.à r.L. v. OJSC Rosneft Oil Company |
Case number | A3/2011/1790 |
Applicable NYC Provisions | V | V(1) | V(1)(a) |
Source |
[2012] EWCA Civ 855 | online: BAILII |
Languages | English |
Summary | The claimant, Yukos Capital S.A.R.L. (“Yukos Capital”) was a Luxembourgian company which had once been a member of the Yukos Group (“Yukos”) in Russia. The defendant, OJSC Rosneft Oil Co. (“Rosneft”), was a Russian State-owned company which had acquired the majority of Yukos’ assets. The acquired assets included a former production subsidiary of Yukos, Yuganskneftegaz (“YNG”). Disputes had arisen in respect of certain loan agreements between Yukos Capital and YNG. The disputes were submitted to arbitration pursuant to the Rules of the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce of Trade and Industry in Russia. The arbitral tribunal issued four awards in favour of Yukos Capital. By the time the awards were issued, YNG had been acquired by Rosneft. Rosneft then applied to the Russian courts to have the awards set aside. The Russian courts granted the application. Meanwhile, Yukos applied to the Dutch courts for enforcement of the awards. The Dutch courts ultimately granted enforcement, refusing to recognise the Russian courts’ setting aside of the awards on the basis that it was the product of a judicial process that was partial and dependent. Yukos also applied to the English High Court to enforce the awards pursuant to section 101(2) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (U.K.) (“the Act”) (providing for enforcement as a judgment or order of the court of an NYC award, as defined by the Act). Rosneft objected to enforcement on three broad grounds. First, it maintained that the awards had been set aside by the Russian courts, relying on section 103(2)(f) of the Act (incorporating Article V(1)(e) NYC regarding refusal to recognise or enforce an award where, inter alia, the award has been set aside by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, it was made). Second, it argued that the allegations by Yukos Capital regarding the conduct of the Russian court proceedings raised a challenge to the validity of executive and administrative acts of a foreign sovereign upon which the English courts could not adjudicate under the act of state doctrine and the doctrine of non-justiciability. Third, it asserted that the awards should not be enforced because they gave effect to an unlawful tax evasion scheme. Yukos Capital replied first, that the Russian courts’ setting aside of the awards was partial and dependent, as the Dutch courts correctly found in their decision granting enforcement, and that this decision bound and estopped Rosneft under the doctrine of issue estoppel; second, that the doctrine of act of state did not apply because there was no challenge to the validity of any act of state and the doctrine of non-justiciability did not apply because the allegations were concerned with judicial standards, which were justiciable; and third, that the allegation of unlawful tax evasion was part of a campaign to strip the Yukos Group of its assets. The High Court was asked to rule on two preliminary issues, namely: (i) whether Rosneft was issue estopped by the decision of the Dutch courts from denying that the Russian courts’ setting aside of the awards was the result of a partial and dependent judicial process and (ii) whether Rosneft was entitled to rely on the act of state and non-justiciability doctrines. The High Court ruled in favour of Yukos Capital on both of the preliminary issues. Rosneft appealed. The Court of Appeal upheld the appeal on the question of estoppel, but dismissed the appeal with respect to the question of the act of state and non-justiciability doctrines. In respect of the first question, the Court noted that the Dutch courts had treated the issue of recognition of the Russian courts’ setting aside of the awards as one of public order. In the Court’s view, the notion of “public order” was inevitably different in each country. In particular, it noted that the standards by which the courts of any particular country resolved the question whether the courts of another country were “partial and dependent” might vary considerably. It concluded that in an English court this question fell to be determined as a matter of English law. In respect of the second question, the Court reasoned that the act of state doctrine did not prevent an English court subject to the requirements of an international convention such as the NYC from examining whether a foreign court decision should be recognised or enforced. In its view, while the principle of international comity required cogent grounds for non-recognition or non-enforcement, that was a matter of evidence and argument, rather than one of state immunity or non-justiciability. |
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