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Egypt / 27 March 1996 / Egypt, Court of Cassation / Egyptian Concrete Company & Hashem Ali Maher v. STC Finance & Ismail Ibrahim Mahmoud Thabet & Sabishi Trading and Contracting Company / 2660/59
Country Egypt Court Egypt, Court of Cassation Date 27 March 1996 Parties Egyptian Concrete Company & Hashem Ali Maher v. STC Finance & Ismail Ibrahim Mahmoud Thabet & Sabishi Trading and Contracting Company Case number 2660/59 Applicable NYC Provisions V | II | I | II(1) | I(2) | V(1)(a) | V(1)(b) Languages English Summary A contract for the lease of equipment was concluded on 16 November 1982 and provided for the application of Swedish law and for the settlement of all disputes arising from its interpretation or performance by arbitration in Sweden. After Egyptian Concrete Company and Hashem Ali Maher (“the Claimants”) stopped paying the rent, arbitration proceedings were initiated and an award was rendered on 4 July 1985 ordering the Claimants to pay damages to STC Finance (“STC”) and Sabishi Trading and Contracting Company (“Sabishi”) and to return the equipment. On 14 January 1987, the North Cairo Court of First Instance accepted STC’s request for granting enforcement to the arbitral award. This ruling was confirmed by the Court of Appeal on 20 May 1989. The Claimants challenged the judgment of the Court of Appeal before the Court of Cassation and alleged (i) that the Court of Appeal incorrectly applied the law since the contract for the lease of equipment, as well as the arbitration agreement it contained, was never concluded, (ii) that the arbitration agreement in question only determined the applicable law and the place of the arbitration without determining the names of the arbitrators or the arbitration body administering the dispute as is required by the NYC, (iii) that the Claimants were not given notice of the commencement of the arbitration proceedings, the names of the arbitrators or summoned to appear in accordance with Swedish law and the NYC, (iv) that the award could not be granted enforcement before having verified whether Sabishi owned the equipment concerned or whether it was owned by a third party, and (v) that the Court of Appeal did not verify whether Egyptian Courts had jurisdiction over the dispute, as is required by the Egyptian Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure (“Code of Procedure”), before granting enforcement to the arbitral award. The Court of Cassation rejected the Claimants’ challenge and upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal granting enforcement to the award. It considered that the NYC presumes that arbitral awards are based on valid arbitration agreements unless the party objecting to enforcement provides evidence, according to Article V(1)(a) NYC, that the arbitration agreement is invalid under the law applicable thereto. In this case, the Claimants’ challenge should be rejected given that it was based on Egyptian law and the Claimants did not provide any such evidence under Swedish law. The Court also considered that Article II(1) NYC, together with Article I(2) NYC, indicates that international arbitration agreements are valid even if the Parties do not appoint the arbitrators as long as the arbitration agreement explicitly or implicitly indicates that the Parties intended that the arbitrators be appointed in accordance with the rules of a permanent arbitral body. According to the Court, the Parties’ agreement that arbitration be held in Sweden and the nature of the lease contract necessarily indicated that the arbitration would be administered by the commercial arbitration center in Sweden. The Court also considered that the Claimants provided no proper evidence that the notices provided to them, with respect to the appointment of arbitrators and of the arbitration proceedings, were not valid under Swedish law. It further considered that, in accordance with Articles I and II NYC, each State party to the NYC recognizes the res judicata effect (“autorité de la chose jugée”) of foreign arbitral awards unless one of the grounds for non-enforcement contained in Article V NYC is established and that arbitral awards have a res judicata effect starting from the date of their issuance and maintain this res judicata effect as long as they exist. Therefore, the local judge may not, when ordering enforcement of arbitral awards, verify whether they are fair or correct on the merits. Accordingly, the Claimants’ challenge of the Court of Appeal’s judgment on the basis that it did not verify whether the equipment was owned by a third party does not fall under any of the grounds for non-enforcement under the NYC. The Court finally noted that, given that Egypt acceded to the NYC by Presidential Decree No. 171/1959, the NYC is applicable as is any other law of the Egyptian State, even when it contradicts the Code of Procedure. Accordingly, it rejected the Claimants’ challenge on the basis that the Court of Appeal did not verify whether Egyptian Courts have jurisdiction over the dispute, reasoning this is not required by the NYC. see also : Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=386&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Switzerland / 07 August 1995 / Switzerland, Camera di esecuzione e fallimenti del Tribunale d’appello, Repubblica e Cantone Ticino / 14.94.00021
Country Switzerland Court Switzerland, Camera di esecuzione e fallimenti del Tribunale d’appello, Repubblica e Cantone Ticino Date 07 August 1995 Case number 14.94.00021 Applicable NYC Provisions III | IV | V | V(1) | V(1)(a) | V(1)(b) | V(1)(d) | V(1)(e) | V(2) | V(2)(b) | VII | VII(1) Source www.sentenze.ti.ch (website of the Canton of Ticino), published with the authorization of the competent authorities
Languages English Summary An award was rendered in Italy on 22 December 1993. Upon X’s request, the Ufficio d’Esecuzione di Lugano (Debt Collection Office of Lugano) issued a payment order, to which Y raised an objection (opposizione). X requested the dismissal of the objection (rigetto definitivo) before the Pretore del Distretto di Lugano (First Instance Court of Lugano). In response, Y relied on Article VII NYC and claimed that X had not complied with the provisions of the Convention between Switzerland and Italy on the recognition and enforcement of judgments of 1933, which provided that the award had to be enforced in Italy first, and that absent such enforcement the award had not yet become binding on the parties pursuant to Article V(1)(e) NYC. Y also argued that (i) the award was null and void according to Article V(1)(d) NYC, since the arbitrators had not complied with the 90 day time limit to render the award, (ii) it had been unable to present its case, in violation of Article V(1)(b) NYC, because the arbitrators had continued with the proceeding after Y’s counsel resigned, (iii) the arbitration agreement was null and void pursuant to Article V(1)(a) NYC since the subject-matter of the dispute was not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law applicable to the agreement (i.e. Italian law), (iv) the award was contrary to Swiss public policy because Y had been unable to present its case, and (v) the arbitrators had not complied with the arbitration agreement because they had decided ex aequo et bono instead of applying the law. In response X argued, inter alia, that pursuant to Article III, the award had become binding on the parties as soon as it had been signed by the arbitrators, irrespective of its recognition and enforcement in Italy. The Pretore rejected Y’s arguments and dismissed the objection. Y appealed the decision. The Camera di Esecuzione e Fallimenti del Tribunale d’Appello (Debt Collection and Bankruptcy Chamber of the Court of Appeal) dismissed the appeal, thus dismissing the objection to the payment order and allowing the enforcement of the award to proceed. The Tribunale d’Appello observed that pursuant to Article 194 of the Federal Act on Private International Law, the NYC is applicable to the enforcement and recognition of foreign awards. Referring to Article VII(1) NYC, the Tribunale d’Appello noted that the Federal Council had decided that a party seeking to recognize or enforce a foreign award could either rely on the provisions of the NYC or on any other more favorable provisions contained in a convention binding Switzerland or under Swiss law. As a consequence, the Tribunale d’Appello held that X was entitled to rely on the provisions of the NYC, which do not require obtaining the award to be enforced in Italy in order to be recognized and enforced in Switzerland. It further held that, pursuant to Article V(1)(e) NYC, the award became binding on the parties as soon as it was signed by the arbitrators. The Tribunale d’Appello rejected Y’s claim that it had been unable to present its case, holding that it had had sufficient time to appoint a new counsel but had failed to do so. It also dismissed Y’s objections that the arbitration agreement was null and void according to Article V(1)(a) NYC, and that the subject-matter was not capable of settlement by arbitration. Lastly, the Tribunale d’Appello held that the recognition and enforcement of the award did not violate Swiss, recalling that according to Swiss case law and doctrine, such violation occurred only when the recognition or enforcement of the award was against the most fundamental rules of Swiss law, which was not the case here. Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=1300&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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United States / 29 May 1995 / United States, U.S. District Court, District of Columbia / Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. Hammermills, Inc. / 90-0169
Country United States Court United States, U.S. District Court, District of Columbia Date 29 May 1995 Parties Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. Hammermills, Inc. Case number 90-0169 Applicable NYC Provisions V | V(1)(b) | V(1)(c) Languages English Summary Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee (“CBG”), a Delaware corporation, and Hammermills, a dissolved corporation under the laws of Missouri, which was subsequently dissolved, entered into a sale and purchase agreement. A dispute arose and arbitration was commenced pursuant to an arbitration agreement contained in the contract which provided for arbitration under the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”). A sole arbitrator dismissed CBG’s claim against Hammermills and quantified Hammermills’ “normal legal costs”. CBG filed a motion to vacate the award arguing that: (i) it was denied due process within the meaning of Article V(1)(b) NYC because it did not receive adequate notice of the arbitrator’s intention to quantify legal fees against it and had no opportunity to be heard on the issue; and (ii) the arbitrator’s addition of the fee assessment subsequent to the approval of the award by the ICC Court violated the ICC Rules within the meaning of Article V(1)(c) NYC. Hammermills filed a motion for summary judgment of its motion seeking to enforce the award. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied CBG’s application to vacate the award and granted summary judgment for Hammermills’ motion for confirmation and enforcement of the award. The District Court found that CBG was accorded sufficient notice that the assessment of legal fees was at issue in the arbitration, thus, there had been no violation of due process within the meaning of Article V(1)(b) NYC. The District Court held that CBG had not established a defense to enforcement under Article V(1)(d) NYC, basing its conclusion on expert evidence submitted by both parties regarding procedures under the ICC Rules. Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=1150&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Benin / 25 January 1994 / Benin, Tribunal de Première Instance de Cotonou / M. Adeossi v Sonapra / Ordonnance n°19/94
Country Benin | OHADA Court Benin, Tribunal de Première Instance de Cotonou Date 25 January 1994 Parties M. Adeossi v Sonapra Case number Ordonnance n°19/94 Applicable NYC Provisions V | V(1)(b) Source OHADATA J-08-176
Languages English Summary An arbitral award was rendered in the Havre (France) on 20 December 1993. Mr. Adeossi requested the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award in Benin. The Tribunal de Première Instance de Cotonou (Cotonou First Instance Tribunal) refused to enforce the arbitral award. It reasoned that the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards were governed by the NYC (ratified by Benin in 1974) and the Code of Civil Procedure, and verified whether the conditions provided in Article V NYC and Article 1030 of the Code of Civil Procedure were fulfilled, inter alia (i) the regularity of the foreign decision (formal requirement), (ii) whether the respondents were able to participate in the proceeding, (iii) whether the delays had been complied with, (iv) whether due process had been violated, (v) whether the arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the dispute, and (vi) whether the award was contrary to domestic public policy. In the case at hand, the Tribunal de Première Instance de Cotonou held that due process had been violated. In this respect, it noted that after the date of closing of the proceeding, both parties had filed supplemental briefs and that, although the brief submitted by SONAPRA had been declared inadmissible, the arbitral tribunal had relied on various arguments raised by Mr. Adeossi in his final brief submitted after SONAPRA's submission which had been refused. Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=540&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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France / 12 February 1993 / France, Cour d'appel de Paris / Société Unichips Finanziaria SpA and Société Unichips International BV v. Consorts Gesnouin / 92-14017
Country France Court France, Cour d'appel de Paris (Court of Appeal of Paris) Date 12 February 1993 Parties Société Unichips Finanziaria SpA and Société Unichips International BV v. Consorts Gesnouin Case number 92-14017 Applicable NYC Provisions V | V(1) | V(1)(b) | V(1)(c) | V(2) | V(2)(b) | VII | VII(1) Source Original decision obtained from the registry of the Cour d’appel de Paris
Summary On 25 February 1988, two individuals sold their shares in various companies of the Gesnouin Group to an Italian company (Unichips). A dispute arose and the two individuals commenced arbitration against Unichips. An award was rendered on 18 and 27 December 1990 in their favor. On 1 July 1991, the Swiss Federal Court rejected Unichips' action to set aside the award. In an order issued on 19 February 1992, the President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (First Instance Court of Paris) allowed enforcement of the award in France. Appealing this decision, Unichips argued that (i) the arbitral tribunal ruled without complying with the mandate conferred upon it (Article 1502 3° of the Code of Civil Procedure), (ii) due process was violated (Article 1502 4°), and (iii) the award was contrary to international public policy (Article 1502 5°). The two individuals contented that French courts were bound by the decision of the Swiss Federal Court and thus could not control the international validity of the award. The Cour d'appel de Paris (Paris Court of Appeal) upheld the enforcement order and dismissed the appeal. It first reasoned that the enforcement of an international award is subject to enforcement procedures in accordance with the conditions set forth in the NYC and under French law. It then held that the decision of the Swiss Federal Court dismissing the action to set aside the award does not deprive French courts from controlling the international validity of an award in order to allow its integration in the French legal order, whether this control is made with regard to the NYC or French law. It thus declared the appeal of the enforcement order admissible, while noting that pursuant to Article VII NYC, if the requirements for the recognition and enforcement of an award under French law are less strict than that of the NYC, the former shall prevail. The Cour d'appel de Paris then dismissed Unichips' arguments based on Article V NYC and Article 1502 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As to the violation of due process, it noted that Article V(1)(b) NYC and Article 1502 4° of the Code of Civil Procedure have the same purpose and are similar in their content and scope. It noted further, regarding the violation of international public policy, that the provisions of Article V(2)(b) and Article 1502 5° of the Code of Civil Procedure are identical. see also : Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=135&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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United States / 24 November 1992 / United States, U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit / Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp. / 92-7217
Country United States Court United States, U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit Date 24 November 1992 Parties Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp. Case number 92-7217 Applicable NYC Provisions V | V(1)(b) Languages English Summary Avco Corporation (“Avco”) entered into series of contracts with Iran Aircraft Industries for the repair and replacement of helicopter engines. A dispute arose and was submitted by the parties to the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. By an award dated 18 July 1988, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal denied Avco’s claims. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut refused to enforce the award. Iran Aircraft Industries appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the order of the District Court denying enforcement of the award. In so ruling, it found that the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal’s awards are not “directly” enforceable in the United States courts and are subject to the defenses to enforcement provided in the NYC. The Court then held that Avco had been “unable to present [its] case” within the meaning of Article V(1)(b) NYC. The Court determined that the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal had denied Avco the opportunity to present its claim in a meaningful manner because one of the judges had approved a method of proof proposed by Avco (submission of Avco’s audited accounts receivable ledgers) which was later questioned by another judge, who requested the actual invoices to substantiate Avco’s claim. The Court of Appeals thus concluded that Avco was misled regarding the evidence it was required to submit, and was thus deprived of the possibility to present its case. Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=1148&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Korea / 01 May 1992 / Korea, Seoul Civil District Court / Gwangzhou Ocean Shipping Company v. Eagle Merchant Marine Co., Ltd. / 91Gahap45511
Country Korea Court Korea, Seoul Civil District Court Date 01 May 1992 Parties Gwangzhou Ocean Shipping Company v. Eagle Merchant Marine Co., Ltd. Case number 91Gahap45511 Applicable NYC Provisions II | IV | IV(1) | V | V(1) | V(1)(b) Source Languages Korean Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=6439&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Hong Kong / 23 August 1991 / Hong Kong, High Court, In the Supreme Court of Hong Kong / Guangdong New Technology Import & Export Corp Jiangmen Branch [China] v. Chiu Shing T/A BC Property & Trading Co [HK] / Miscellaneous proceedings No 1625 of 1991
Country Hong Kong Court Hong Kong, High Court, In the Supreme Court of Hong Kong Date 23 August 1991 Parties Guangdong New Technology Import & Export Corp Jiangmen Branch [China] v. Chiu Shing T/A BC Property & Trading Co [HK] Case number Miscellaneous proceedings No 1625 of 1991 Applicable NYC Provisions V | IV | V(1)(d) | V(1)(b) | IV(1) Source [1991] 2 HKC 459 (HC)
Languages English Summary Pursuant to Section 44 of the Arbitration Ordinance (which implements Article V NYC), Plaintiff, Guangdong New Technology Import & export Corp. Jiangmen Branch (“Guangdong”), brought an action to enforce an arbitral award rendered in China. Defendant, Chiu Shing T/A BC Property & Trading Co. (Chiu Shing”), challenged enforcement on the grounds that: (1) Guangdong had not produced a “duly authenticated original award”; (2) Guangdong had not produced a “duly certified copy” of the original arbitration agreement; (3) it (Chiu Shing) received late notice of the arbitral proceedings; and (4) the composition of the arbitral tribunal was not in accordance with the parties agreement. The court found that the original award, accompanied by an affidavit affirming its authenticity was sufficient to meet the requirement set forth in the NYC and the domestic implementing legislation. The court also found that copies of a document containing an arbitration clause — which had been incorporated by reference into the parties’ contract—sufficiently depicted the “original arbitration agreement” required for enforcement of an arbitral award. In response to Chiu Shing’s contention that it received late notice of the arbitiral proceedings, the court pointed out that despite such late notice, Chiu Shing did have an opportunity to present its case to the arbitral tribunal. Finally, the court rejected Chiu Shing’s argument that the tribunal was improperly constituted because the parties had intended the “Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade” to resolve their dispute and the dispute was handled by the “China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission” instead—the court pointed out that the tribunal had clearly indicated in the award that it had recently changed its name from the former to the latter. For these reasons, the court granted leave for the award to be enforced in the same manner as a judgment of the court. see also : Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=486&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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United States / 24 August 1990 / United States, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York / Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Indus. Y Comercial / 90 Civ. 0720 (KC)
Country United States Court United States, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York Date 24 August 1990 Parties Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Indus. Y Comercial Case number 90 Civ. 0720 (KC) Applicable NYC Provisions V | III | V(1)(b) | V(1)(c) | V(1)(e) | V(2)(b) Languages English Summary International Standard Electric Corporation (“ISEC”), an American corporation, and Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, (“Bridas”), an Argentinean company, entered into a shareholders agreement. A dispute arose and arbitration was commenced in Mexico City pursuant to an arbitration clause in the agreement which provided for arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) under U.S. law. An arbitral tribunal ruled in favor of Bridas. ISEC filed a petition in the United States Court for the Southern District of New York to vacate the award. Bridas cross-petitioned the District Court and sought enforcement of the award under Article III NYC. ISEC opposed the enforcement on three grounds. First, it argued that it was unable to present its case within the meaning of Article V(1)(b) NYC. Second, it argued that the arbitrators had exceeded their authority by awarding damages based on equitable norms rather than legal grounds, in violation of Article V(1)(c) NYC. Third, it argued that enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of the United States pursuant to Article V (2)(b) NYC because “the secret procedures” utilized by the arbitrators in appointing an expert violated due process standards. The District Court dismissed SEC’s petition to vacate the award for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and granted Bridas’ cross-petition to enforce the award. In so ruling, it found that the “competent authority” within the meaning of Article V(1)(e) NYC, for entertaining the action of setting aside the award, is the “country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made”. The Court found that the contested language “the country under the law of which that award was made” meant the procedural law of the arbitration and not the substantive law of the contract. Hence, only the courts of Mexico, where the arbitration took place, had jurisdiction under the NYC to vacate the award. The District Court found no basis under the NYC to refuse enforcement of the award. The Court found that SEC had waived its right to object to the tribunal’s decision to appoint an independent expert since it did not object to the appointment procedure at the time. There were therefore no grounds for non-enforcement pursuant to Articles V(1)(b) NYC and V(1)(b) NYC. The Court also found that the appointment procedure did not amount to a violation of U.S. public policy within the meaning of Article V(2)(b) NYC. In connection with the second defense under Article V(1)(c) NYC, the District Court found it to be a disguised “manifest disregard of law” defense, which it dismissed on the grounds that it was prevented under the NYC to reconsider the factual findings of the arbitral panel. Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=1157&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Egypt / 16 July 1990 / Egypt, Court of Cassation / Egyptian Saudi Hotels Company v. Kurt & Daves Corporation / 2994/57
Country Egypt Court Egypt, Court of Cassation Date 16 July 1990 Parties Egyptian Saudi Hotels Company v. Kurt & Daves Corporation Case number 2994/57 Applicable NYC Provisions V | II | I | V(1)(b) Languages English Summary On 14 September 1978, Egyptian Saudi Hotels Company (“Egyptian Saudi Hotels”) and Kurt & Daves Corporation (“Kurt & Daves”) concluded a contract by which Kurt & Daves undertook to provide architectural design and engineering services for the construction of a hotel. Article 9 of said contract provided that it was governed by English law and that all matters, claims and disputes arising from the contract which could not be amicably settled should be subject to arbitration in London in accordance with the Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (the “ICC Rules”). Claiming that Egyptian Saudi Hotels breached the contract, Kurt & Daves initiated arbitration proceedings. On 28 October 1983, an award was rendered in Kurt & Daves’ favor. On 26 February 1987, the Court of First Instance issued a judgment granting enforcement to the arbitral award, which was confirmed on 26 November 1987 by the Cairo Court of Appeal. Egyptian Saudi Hotels challenged the judgment of the Court of Appeal before the Court of Cassation and alleged, inter alia, that the Court of Appeal incorrectly applied the law since Egyptian Saudi Hotels was not a Party to the contract, and that it did not verify whether Egyptian Saudi Hotels was correctly given notice of the arbitration proceedings and whether Egyptian Courts had jurisdiction over the dispute, as is required by the Egyptian Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure (“Code of Procedure”). The Court of Cassation rejected the challenge made by Egyptian Saudi Hotels and upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal granting enforcement to the award. The Court considered that, in accordance with Articles I and II NYC, each State party to the NYC recognizes the res judicata effect (“autorité de la chose jugée”) of foreign arbitral awards unless one of the grounds for non-enforcement contained in Article V NYC is established and that arbitral awards have a res judicata effect (“autorité de la chose jugée”) starting from the date of their issuance and maintain this res judicata effect as long as they exist. Therefore, the judge may not, when ordering enforcement of arbitral awards, verify whether they are fair or correct on the merits. Accordingly, Egyptian Saudi Hotels’ challenge to the Court of Appeal’s judgment on the basis that it was not a party to the contract does not fall under any of the grounds for non-enforcement of arbitral awards. The Court further noted that, given that Egypt acceded to the NYC by Presidential Decree No. 171/1959, the NYC is applicable like any other law of the Egyptian State, even when it contradicts the Code of Procedure. Egyptian Saudi Hotels’ challenge on the basis that the Court of Appeal did not verify whether Egyptian Courts have jurisdiction over the dispute must be rejected, since this is not required by the NYC. According to Article 22 of the Civil Code, the rules of procedure are governed by the law of the forum and the ground contained in Article V(1)(b) NYC for non-enforcement of awards is a rule of procedure which is subject to the law of the judge. The Court rejected Egyptian Saudi Hotels’ challenge given that, according to the arbitral award, the sole arbitrator was assured that notice was sent to Egyptian Saudi Hotels and that the latter did not provide evidence establishing that it was not given notice in accordance with the law of the judge. Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=385&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Korea / 10 April 1990 / Korea, Supreme Court of Korea / GKN International Training (London) Limited v. Kukje Trading Co., Ltd. / 89Daka20252
Country Korea Court Korea, Supreme Court of Korea Date 10 April 1990 Parties GKN International Training (London) Limited v. Kukje Trading Co., Ltd. Case number 89Daka20252 Applicable NYC Provisions I | I(1) | I(3) | II | II(2) | III | IV | V | V(1) | V(1)(a) | V(1)(b) | V(1)(d) | V(2) | V(2)(b) Source Languages Korean Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=6415&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country Germany Court Germany, Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) Date 18 January 1990 Case number III ZR 269/88 Applicable NYC Provisions I | V | I(1) | V(1)(b) | V(2)(b) Source Original decision obtained from the registry of the Bundesgerichtshof Languages English Summary The parties concluded a contract for the sale of barley. A dispute arose and the Buyer initiated arbitration proceedings with the Grain and Feed Trade Association (GAFTA), which issued two awards ordering the Seller to pay damages to the Buyer. The Seller sought to have the awards annulled by the High Court of Justice in London but was unsuccessful. The Buyer sought enforcement of the award before the Landgericht (Regional Court) Hamburg. The Seller objected to the enforcement, arguing that the arbitral proceedings had been conducted deficiently since a third person had been involved as consultant in the oral hearing and the writing of the award. In addition, the Seller alleged that false testimony and insufficient factual statements by the Buyer had drawn an incorrect picture of the economic situation and that the arbitral tribunal had violated the Seller’s right to be heard. The Landgericht granted the enforcement of the first award in its entirety and part of the second award. The Seller unsuccessfully appealed the decision of the Landgericht to the Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court) Hamburg. The Seller then appealed to the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court). The Bundesgerichtshof confirmed the decision of the lower courts, stating that enforcement was subject to the NYC and Section 1044 of the German Civil Procedure Code, based on which it saw no impediments to granting enforcement. The Bundesgerichtshof stated that it did not need to decide whether the application should be assessed in accordance with Section 1044 of the German Civil Procedure Code or the NYC, since either would lead to enforcement being granted. The Bundesgerichtshof stated that both awards fulfilled the requirements of Section 1044(1) sentence 1 of the German Civil Procedure Code and Article I(1) NYC, since, as the Oberlandesgericht had stated, the arbitral awards had become binding upon the parties as they could no longer be challenged before an arbitral tribunal or state court. The Bundesgerichtshof held that recognition of the arbitral awards would not lead to a result that was in obvious contradiction with fundamental principles of German law (Section 1044(2) German Civil Procedure Code and Article V(2)(a) [sic] NYC). In this context, the Bundesgerichtshof found that the involvement of a legal consultant in the proceedings, by the tribunal, did not constitute a public policy violation since such a violation could not simply be assumed on the grounds of a deviation of a foreign arbitral procedure from mandatory domestic procedural law. It reasoned that a divergence was only relevant when it violated international public policy, which was a less restrictive standard for the recognition of foreign arbitral awards as compared to the regime for the recognition of domestic arbitral awards. According to the Bundesgerichtshof, the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award would only be refused if the arbitral proceedings had a severe defect that touched upon the fundamental basis of public and economic life, which was not the case here. With respect to the Seller’s contention that the arbitral tribunal had not appreciated that the Buyer did not have the necessary funds to secure the purchase price claim by way of a letter of credit, the Bundesgerichtshof held that this argument had already been raised before the arbitral tribunal and could therefore not be brought at the enforcement stage. It based this conclusion on the fact that the existence of grounds for revision under Section 580 of the German Civil Procedure Code, which would generally imply violations of international public policy, could no longer be raised in proceedings for recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award if the underlying facts had already been raised in the arbitral proceedings. The Bundesgerichtshof also rejected the alleged violation of the Seller’s right to be heard under Article 1044(2) No. 4 of the German Civil Procedure Code and Article V(1)(b) NYC. It held that, even if the tribunal had not addressed all of the Seller’s arguments, this did not violate the Seller’s right to be heard since an arbitral tribunal does not have to discuss its position vis-à-vis all of the parties’ arguments, rather, it is sufficient that the arbitral tribunal discusses the arguments that underlie its reasoning in the award. see also : Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=1335&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country Germany Court Germany, Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Date 26 January 1989 Case number 6 U 71/88 Applicable NYC Provisions V | V(2)(b) | V(1)(b) Source OLG Hamburg Languages English Summary The parties concluded a contract for the delivery of soybean flour providing for Grain and Feed Trade Association (GAFTA) arbitration in London. The United States placed an embargo on the merchandise. The Buyer accepted partial delivery of the goods, but refused to take delivery of the rest of the cargo. The Seller initiated arbitration proceedings. The arbitral tribunal denied the claim and granted the Buyer’s counterclaim. The award was confirmed by the GAFTA Board of Appeal. The Seller’s challenge before the High Court in London was dismissed while the Buyer’s request for leave to enforce before the Landgericht (Regional Court) Hamburg was granted. The Seller appealed. The Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court Hamburg) confirmed the decision of the Landgericht and dismissed the Buyer’s objections based on Articles V(2)(b) and V(1)(b) NYC. The Oberlandesgericht held that the award did not breach German public policy by obliging the Seller alone to bear the consequences of the U.S. embargo because the Seller had failed to demonstrate and prove that it was actually inhibited by the embargo from fulfilling its contractual obligations. It also held that by granting compound interest to the Buyer the award did not breach German public policy because the remedy was allowed by the law of the seat i.e. English law. It also dismissed the Seller’s allegation that the award was made in breach of its right to be heard because it had not been properly informed about the existence of the Buyer’s counterclaims during the arbitration. The Seller had various opportunities to bring these objections before the GAFTA Board of Appeal or before the London High Court but had failed to do so. see also : Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=920&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Switzerland / 12 January 1989 / Switzerland, Tribunale Federale (Federal Tribunal) / X S.A. v. Y Ltd. / 5P.249/1988
Country Switzerland Court Switzerland, Tribunale Federale (Federal Tribunal) Date 12 January 1989 Parties X S.A. v. Y Ltd. Case number 5P.249/1988 Applicable NYC Provisions II | II(1) | II(2) | V | V(1) | V(1)(b) | V(2) | V(2)(b) Source Original decision obtained from the registry of the Tribunale Federale
Languages English Summary X, a Swiss company, entered into a sales agreement with Y, a British company, which provided for arbitration in Great Britain. The contract was not signed by the parties but by a broker, acting as mediator. Following a dispute regarding the delivery of goods, Y initiated arbitration proceedings, which were later suspended when the parties agreed upon a new sale and by way of an addendum to the sales agreement. X failed to deliver the goods under the addendum and Y pursued arbitration, obtaining an award in its favor. Upon Y’s request, a payment order was issued in Switzerland, to which X raised an objection (opposizione). The objection was dismissed successively by both the Segretaria Assessore della Pretura di Lugano (Assessor Secretary of the First Instance Court of Lugano) and the Camera di Esecuzione e Fallimenti del Tribunale d’Appello (Debt Collection and Bankruptcy Chamber of the Court of Appeal). X appealed the decision of the Tribunale d’Appello, arguing that pursuant to Article II(1) and II(2) NYC it was not bound by the arbitration clause because it had not been sent the sales agreement signed by the broker, and had never consented in writing to the arbitration clause contained therein. X also claimed that the award could not be relied upon since (i) X had been unable to present its case, constituting a breach of Article V(1)(b) NYC (ii) the arbitrator appointed by Y had been partial, and (iii) the award was contrary to Swiss public policy as the parties had not had any influence on the composition of the arbitral tribunal given that the arbitration rules required arbitrators to be members of a certain association. The Tribunale Federale Svizzero (Federal Tribunal) dismissed the appeal, thereby dismissing the objection to the payment order (rigetto definitivo). The Tribunale Federale held that the parties had confirmed their consent to the arbitration clause by stating in the addendum that the terms and conditions of the sales agreement were to remain in force. It also found that X had received written notifications of the arbitration and had therefore been fully able to present its case. After noting that issues regarding an arbitrators partiality were governed by Articles V(1)(b) and V(2)(b) NYC and Swiss law, it found that X had failed to produce any evidence in support of its claim. Finally, the Tribunale Federale ruled that the arbitration rules governed the appointment of arbitrators, and it was not contrary to Swiss public policy that the arbitrators were required to be members of a certain association. see also : Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=1290&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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United States / 27 October 1988 / United States, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York / Geotech Lizenz A.G. v. Evergreen Systems, Inc. / CV 88–1406
Country United States Court United States, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York Date 27 October 1988 Parties Geotech Lizenz A.G. v. Evergreen Systems, Inc. Case number CV 88–1406 Applicable NYC Provisions V | IV | V(1)(a) | V(1)(b) | V(1)(c) | V(2)(b) Languages English Summary Geotech, a Swiss company, entered into a partnership agreement with Evergreen, an American company. The partnership agreement referred to a license agreement which contained an arbitration clause providing for arbitration under the rules of the Zurich Chamber of Commerce. A dispute arose and the parties allegedly entered into a settlement agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”). Subsequently, Geotech commenced arbitration and obtained a favorable award. Geotech applied for recognition and enforcement in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Evergreen resisted enforcement, arguing that: (i) the arbitration agreement was “invalid” pursuant to Article V(1)(a) NYC because it had been superseded by the Settlement Agreement; (ii) the arbitrator decided matters that were beyond the scope of the arbitration pursuant to Article V(1)(c) NYC; (iii) Evergreen was not given proper notice pursuant to Article V(1)(b) NYC; and (iv) enforcement of the award would be against public policy pursuant to Article V(2)(b) NYC in light of arguments (i), (ii) (iii) and (iv) above. The District Court granted Geotech’s petition for enforcement of the arbitral award. The Court found that the requirements of Article IV NYC had been fulfilled and that Geotech submitted certified copies of the award and the agreement. The Court found no basis under the NYC to refuse enforcement of the award. First, the Court rejected the contention that the Settlement Agreement superseded the license agreement and rendered the arbitration agreement invalid under Article V(1)(a) NYC, finding that the parties had in fact not settled their disputes. Second, the Court found that Evergreen had been given adequate notice of the arbitration proceedings as it had been informed of every stage of the arbitration process and was given an adequate opportunity to participate within the meaning of Article V(1)(b) NYC. Third, the Court rejected Evergreen’s public policy defense under Article V(2)(b) NYC, holding that such a defense would only be applicable if enforcement of the award violated “the most basic notions of morality and justice” of the forum where enforcement was sought. Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=1155&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country Germany Court Germany, Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) Date 14 April 1988 Case number III ZR 12/87 Applicable NYC Provisions V | I | V(2)(b) | V(1)(e) | V(1)(d) | V(1)(b) | I(1) Source Original decision obtained from the registry of the Bundesgerichtshof Languages English Summary The prevailing party in an International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration seated in Belgium sought enforcement of the award in Germany. The Landgericht (Regional Court) Stuttgart declared the award enforceable, but its decision was reversed by the Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court) Stuttgart on appeal. The decision of the Oberlandesgericht was appealed before the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court). The Bundesgerichtshof reversed the Oberlandesgericht’s decision and reinstated the decision of the Landgericht, which had declared the award enforceable. It found that the NYC was applicable since the award had been rendered within the territory of another contracting state as per Article I(1) NYC. The Bundesgerichtshof held that the formal prerequisites set forth by Article IV NYC had been met and there were no grounds to refuse enforcement of the award under Article V NYC. First, it held that the award had become binding within the meaning of Article V(1)(e) NYC since it was not subject to appeal before a higher arbitral tribunal or a state court . Second, although the tribunal had exceeded the time limit for rendering its award under the ICC Rules, according to the Bundesgerichtshof, this would not constitute grounds for non-enforcement under Article V(1)(d) NYC. In this respect, it noted that under the ICC Rules an arbitral tribunal does not become functus officio unless it is substituted by a different tribunal, even if it fails to render its award within the prescribed time limit; thus, the extension of the time limit for rendering the award had nothing to do with the “composition of the arbitral authority.” Third, it ruled that not giving a party the opportunity to comment on the extension of the time limit for the issuance of the award did not constitute a ground for refusing enforcement under Article V(1)(b) NYC, recalling that this provision merely required that the parties be informed of the constitution of the arbitral tribunal and the existence of arbitral proceedings. The Bundesgerichtshof also dismissed the argument that the enforcement of the award would violate German public policy pursuant to Article V(2)(b) NYC, since the unsuccessful party had failed to make use of the possibility to comment on the extension of the time limit, thus the ICC Court’s failure to explicitly ask for the parties’ comments regarding the extension of the time limit for rendering of the arbitral award did not constitute a violation of German public policy. see also : Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=921&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Austria / 17 December 1986 / Austria, Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) / K**** Ungarisches Außenhandelsunternehmen für Fabriksanlagen v. M**** Haus und Liegenschaftsverwaltungs GmbH / 3Ob32/86
Country Austria Court Austria, Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) Date 17 December 1986 Parties K**** Ungarisches Außenhandelsunternehmen für Fabriksanlagen v. M**** Haus und Liegenschaftsverwaltungs GmbH Case number 3Ob32/86 Applicable NYC Provisions II | III | IV | IV(1) | V | V(1) | V(1)(b) | V(2) Source Languages German Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=3900&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Spain / 07 October 1986 / Spain, Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) / T.H. Van Huystee B.V. v. Mr. Benedicto / ATS 624/1986
Country Spain Court Spain, Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) Date 07 October 1986 Parties T.H. Van Huystee B.V. v. Mr. Benedicto Case number ATS 624/1986 Applicable NYC Provisions IV | IV(1) | IV(1)(b) | V | V(1) | V(1)(b) Source Consejo General del Poder Judicial (Centro de Documentación Judicial – CENDOJ)
Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=4646&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Spain / 07 October 1986 / Spain, Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) / T.H. Van Huystee B.V. v. Mr. Jose Enrique / STS 5279/1986
Country Spain Court Spain, Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) Date 07 October 1986 Parties T.H. Van Huystee B.V. v. Mr. Jose Enrique Case number STS 5279/1986 Applicable NYC Provisions IV | IV(1) | IV(1)(b) | V | V(1) | V(1)(b) Source Consejo General del Poder Judicial (Centro de Documentación Judicial – CENDOJ)
Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=4645&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Spain / 29 April 1985 / Spain, Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) / Simonsen & Slang A/S v. Delta 2.000 S.A. / ATS 295/1985
Country Spain Court Spain, Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) Date 29 April 1985 Parties Simonsen & Slang A/S v. Delta 2.000 S.A. Case number ATS 295/1985 Applicable NYC Provisions II | II(1) | II(2) | IV | IV(1) | IV(1)(b) | V | V(1) | V(1)(a) | V(1)(b) Source Consejo General del Poder Judicial (Centro de Documentación Judicial – CENDOJ)
Languages Spanish Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=3971&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Korea / 12 April 1984 / Korea, Seoul Civil District Court / Cheil Steamer Co., Ltd. v. Construction Industry Co., Ltd. / 83Gahap7051
Country Korea Court Korea, Seoul Civil District Court Date 12 April 1984 Parties Cheil Steamer Co., Ltd. v. Construction Industry Co., Ltd. Case number 83Gahap7051 Applicable NYC Provisions III | IV | IV(1) | IV(2) | V | V(1) | V(1)(b) | V(1)(d) | V(2) | V(2)(b) Source Languages English Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=6414&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Spain / 17 June 1983 / Spain, Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) / Ludmila C. Shipping Company Limited v. Maderas G.L. S.A. / ATS 680/1983
Country Spain Court Spain, Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) Date 17 June 1983 Parties Ludmila C. Shipping Company Limited v. Maderas G.L. S.A. Case number ATS 680/1983 Applicable NYC Provisions I | II | V | V(1) | V(1)(a) | V(1)(b) | V(2) | V(2)(b) Source Consejo General del Poder Judicial (Centro de Documentación Judicial – CENDOJ)
Languages Spanish Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=3967&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country Germany Court Germany, Landgericht Bremen Date 20 January 1983 Case number 12-O-184/1981 Applicable NYC Provisions V | V(1)(b) Source Original decision obtained from the registry of the Landgericht Bremen Languages English Summary The Grain and Feed Trade Association (GAFTA) in London rendered an award in favour of a Portuguese company against a German company which had entered bankruptcy proceedings during the course of the arbitral proceedings. The Portuguese company sought enforcement in Germany. The Landgericht (Regional Court) Bremen refused to declare the award enforceable under Article V(1)(b) NYC finding that the German company had not been given the opportunity to present its case in the arbitration proceedings since it had not been informed of the Portuguese company’s arguments in the arbitration. According to the Landgericht Bremen, only providing the opportunity to a party to submit documents relating to a disputed contract or to give its view, without knowledge of the opponent’s arguments, did not sufficiently satisfy the party’s right to be heard. Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=923&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Spain / 24 March 1982 / Spain, Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) / Comineo France S.A. v. Soquiber S.L. / ATS 479/1982
Country Spain Court Spain, Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) Date 24 March 1982 Parties Comineo France S.A. v. Soquiber S.L. Case number ATS 479/1982 Applicable NYC Provisions I | I(2) | II | II(1) | II(2) | IV | IV(1) | IV(1)(a) | IV(1)(b) | V | V(1) | V(1)(b) | V(1)(e) Source Consejo General del Poder Judicial (Centro de Documentación Judicial – CENDOJ)
Languages Spanish Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=3963&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Switzerland / 08 February 1978 / Switzerland, Tribunal Fédéral (Federal Tribunal) / X SA v. Y Ltd / P. 217/76
Country Switzerland Court Switzerland, Tribunal fédéral (Federal Tribunal) Date 08 February 1978 Parties X SA v. Y Ltd Case number P. 217/76 Applicable NYC Provisions V | V(1) | V(1)(b) | V(1)(d) | V(2) | V(2)(b) Source Original decision obtained from the registry of the Tribunal Fédéral
Languages English Summary An International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) award was rendered on 1 October 1973, in The Hague, in favor of Y against X. Y sought enforcement of the award in Switzerland pursuant to Article IV NYC by producing the original award, its sworn translation and the original contract containing the arbitration agreement. X challenged the enforcement on the grounds that the award violated public policy under Article V(2)(b) NYC, as the arbitrators had consulted an expert in the chrome industry in the absence of the parties. The Tribunal de première instance of Geneva (Geneva Tribunal of First Instance) denied enforcement on the ground that the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the arbitration agreement. On appeal, the Cour de Justice of Geneva (Geneva Court of Appeal) overturned the decision and allowed the enforcement of the award. X appealed, invoking a violation of Articles V(1)(b) and V(1)(d) NYC. The Tribunal Fédéral (Federal Tribunal) confirmed the decision of the Cour de Justice of Geneva and allowed the enforcement of the award. The Tribunal Fédéral confirmed that the NYC was applicable to govern the enforcement procedure of an award rendered in the Netherlands, a State party to the NYC. The Tribunal Fédéral differentiated between Article V(1) NYC, which lists grounds which must be raised by the party opposing enforcement while grounds under Article V(2) NYC may be raised sua ponte by the enforcing court. The Tribunal Fédéral analyzed both Articles V(1)(b) and V(1)(d) grounds under the perspective of public policy and recalled that a violation of public policy could relate to the award itself or to the procedure according to which it has been rendered and that denial of enforcement of an award could be granted only in case of a violation of the fundamental principles of the Swiss legal order. The Tribunal Fédéral held that the fact that the arbitrators sought external and professional advice on the commercial context of the dispute but not on an issue which could bring a solution to the case did not amount to a violation of fundamental principles of Swiss public policy. affirms : Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=908&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Switzerland / 17 September 1976 / Switzerland, Cour de Justice de Genève / L Ltd. v. C S.A. (GE) / 549
Country Switzerland Court Switzerland, Cour de Justice de Genève (Geneva Court of Justice) Date 17 September 1976 Parties L Ltd. v. C S.A. (GE) Case number 549 Applicable NYC Provisions V | V(1) | V(1)(b) | V(1)(d) | V(1)(e) Source Original decision obtained from the registry of the Cour de Justice de Genève
Languages English Summary A contract of sale was entered into between L and C, which contained an arbitration agreement providing for International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration. A dispute arose between the parties and an award was rendered on 1 October 1973, in The Hague, in favor of L. L sought enforcement of the award in Switzerland pursuant to Article IV NYC by producing the original award, its sworn translation and the original contract containing the arbitration agreement. C opposed the enforcement on the ground that the award violated public policy pursuant to Article V(2)(b) NYC, as the arbitrators had consulted an expert in the chrome industry ex parte. The Tribunal de Première Instance of Geneva (Geneva Tribunal of First Instance) denied enforcement on the grounds that the arbitral procedure had not been in accordance with the arbitration agreement because the three arbitrators had “joined a fourth arbitrator”. L appealed the decision. C objected, claiming a violation of Article V(1)(b) NYC because it was unable to present its case, which means that the procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties (Art. V(1)(d) NYC). The Cour de Justice de Genève (Court of Justice of Geneva) annulled the decision of the Tribunal de Première Instance of Geneva and allowed the enforcement of the award. The Cour de Justice of Geneva held that the NYC was applicable to determine whether C had been unable to present its case pursuant to Article V(1)(b) NYC, resulting in a violation of Article V(1)(d) NYC. It recalled that a violation of public policy could relate to the award itself or to the procedure according to which it has been rendered. The Cour de Justice added that enforcement of an award could only be denied in case of a violation of the fundamental principles of the Swiss legal order, as public policy could not be used to oust the application of international treaties. In the present case, the Cour de Justice held that the arbitrators sought external and professional advice on the commercial context of the chrome industry (which was not prohibited under Dutch law, the law of the seat the arbitration) but not on an issue which was determinative to the case. The Cour de Justice concluded that it did not amount to a violation of fundamental principles of Swiss public policy. The Cour de Justice further added that pursuant to Article V(1)(e) NYC, an award can be set aside by a competent authority in the country which, or under the law of which, that award was made. C had however not seized the competent authorities in the Netherlands. affirmed by : Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=929&opac_view=6 Attachment (2)
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United States / 23 December 1974 / U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit / Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA) / 74-1642, 74-1676
Country United States Court United States, U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit Date 23 December 1974 Parties Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA) Case number 74-1642, 74-1676 Applicable NYC Provisions V | V(2)(b) | V(2)(a) | V(1)(c) | V(1)(b) Source 508 F.2d 969 Languages English Summary Parsons & Whittemore Overseas (“Overseas”), an American corporation, and Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier (“RAKTA”), an Egyptian corporation, entered in a contract for the construction and operation of a paper mill in Egypt. The contract provided for arbitration under the Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC Rules”). RACTA initiated arbitration proceedings claiming damages for breach of the contract, and a final award was rendered in its favor. The award was confirmed by United States federal district court. Overseas appealed this decision and argued that: (i) the enforcement of the award would violate US public policy; (ii) the award represents a decision on matters not appropriate for arbitration; (iii) the Arbitral Tribunal denied Overseas an adequate opportunity to present its case; (iv) the award is predicated upon the resolution of issues outside the scope of the contractual agreement for arbitration, and (v) the award is in manifest disregard of the law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit confirmed the district court’s decision and confirmed the award. In dismissing the first objection, the Court of Appeals held that the public policy provision of Article V(2)(b) NYC should be construed narrowly, and the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be denied only where enforcement would violate the forum state's most basic notions of morality and justice. The court also ruled that the arbitrability of the claim, pursuant to Article V(2)(a) NYC, was not affected by the fact that US foreign policy was somehow implicated in the dispute. The Court found no violation of due process under Article V(1)(b) NYC and found no excess of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under Article V(1)(c) NYC. Finally, the Court declined to determine whether there was an implied defense of “manifest disregard of the law” under the NYC, instead holding that even if there was such a defense, Overseas had failed to establish it. see also : Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=714&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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France / 10 May 1971 / France, Cour d'appel de Paris / Compagnie de Saint-Gobain Pont-à-Mousson v. The Fertilizer Corporation of India Limited / J 9915
Country France Court France, Cour d'appel de Paris (Court of Appeal of Paris) Date 10 May 1971 Parties Compagnie de Saint-Gobain Pont-à-Mousson v. The Fertilizer Corporation of India Limited Case number J 9915 Applicable NYC Provisions V | V(1) | V(1)(b) | V(1)(c) | V(1)(e) | V(2) | V(2)(b) Source Original decision obtained from the registry of the Cour d’appel de Paris
Summary A French company (Saint Gobain) entered into an agreement with an Indian company (Fertilizer Corporation of India Limited - F.C.L.I.) for the construction of a plant in India. A dispute arose and an award was rendered on 29 September 1969 in New Delhi in favor of F.C.L.I. In an order issued on 3 December 1969, the President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (First Instance Court of Paris) allowed enforcement of the award in France. In the meantime, Saint-Gobain initiated an action before the High Court of New Delhi to have the arbitral award declared without legal effect until it had been approved by the aforementioned court. Saint-Gobain also challenged the enforcement order before the President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, arguing that the award had not yet become binding on the parties and that due process had been violated and that therefore the enforcement should be refused pursuant to Articles V(1)(b) and V(1)(e) NYC. In the alternative, Saint-Gobain requested an adjournment of the decision on the enforcement of the award pending the proceedings before the High Court of New Delhi in accordance with Article VI NYC. The President du Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris dismissed the action on 15 May 1970. On 17 November 1970, the Indian Supreme Court declared that the award was final and binding on the parties. Appealing the 15 May 1970 order, Saint-Gobain argued that (i) the arbitral tribunal had failed to comply with the mandate conferred upon it (Article V(1)(c) NYC), (ii) due process had been violated (Article V(1)(b) NYC), and that (iii) the award was contrary to the public policy of the country where recognition and enforcement was sought (Article V(2)(b) NYC). The Cour d'appel de Paris (Paris Court of Appeal) affirmed the decision of the President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris of 15 May 1970 and upheld the enforcement order. It did not refer to the NYC and rejected all of the arguments raised by Saint-Gobain based, inter alia, on the alleged violation of due process and public policy. affirms : see also : Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=110&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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France / 15 May 1970 / France, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris / Compagnie de Saint-Gobain Pont-à-Mousson v. The Fertilizer Corporation of India Limited
Country France Court France, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (Court of First Instance of Paris) Date 15 May 1970 Parties Compagnie de Saint-Gobain Pont-à-Mousson v. The Fertilizer Corporation of India Limited Applicable NYC Provisions I | V | V(1) | V(1)(b) | V(1)(e) | VI Summary A French company (Saint Gobain) entered into an agreement with an Indian company (Nangal Fertilizer and Chemicals Private Ltd, whose rights and obligations had been assumed by Fertilizer Corporation of India Limited - F.C.L.I.) for the construction of a plant in India. A dispute arose and an award was rendered on 19 September 1969 in New Delhi in favor of F.C.L.I. In an order issued on 3 December 1969, the President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (First Instance Court of Paris) allowed enforcement of the award in France. In the meantime, Saint-Gobain initiated an action before the High Court of New Delhi to have the arbitral award declared without legal effect until it had been approved by the aforementioned Court. Saint-Gobain also challenged the enforcement order before the President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, arguing that the award had not yet become binding on the parties and that due process had been violated and therefore the enforcement should be refused pursuant to Articles V(1)(b) and V(1)(e) NYC. In the alternative, Saint-Gobain requested an adjournment of the decision on the enforcement of the award pending the proceedings before the High Court of New Delhi in accordance with Article VI NYC. The President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris upheld the enforcement order and dismissed the action. He first reasoned that under Article V(1)(e) NYC, an award is considered as binding when the award had been rendered in a regular fashion and that all the formalities required for arbitral awards have been complied with. In the case at hand, he held that Saint-Gobain had failed to establish that the award was not binding in the country in which it was made. He then rejected Saint-Gobain's argument based on an alleged violation of due process in breach of Article V(1)(b) NYC, while recalling that, pursuant to Article V(1) NYC, the recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes proof of such violation to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought. As to the request for adjournment of the decision on the enforcement of the award pending the proceedings in India, the President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris considered that Article VI NYC leaves discretion to the enforcement judge to adjourn the decision on the enforcement of the award when proceedings to set aside or suspend the award have been made to a competent authority of the country in which the award was made. He concluded that Saint-Gobain failed to establish that the adjournment would be proper. affirmed by : Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=108&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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11 th meeting [E/CONF.26/SR.11 - E/2704/Rev.1, E/2822 and Add.1-6, E/CONF.26/2, 6/3 and Add.1, 26/4, 26/7, E/CONF.26/L.6-L.31]- 12/09/1958
Comments Meeting held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 27 May 1958, at 2.45 p.m Date 12/09/1958 Classification (first level) C. Summary Records of the United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, New York, 20 May - 10 June 1958 Applicable NYC Provisions II | III | IV | V | V(1)(a) | V(1)(b) | V(1)(c) | V(1)(d) | V(1)(e) | V(2)(a) | V(2)(b) | VI Language(s) French Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=3403&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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