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Hong Kong / 13 July 1994 / Hong Kong, High Court, In the Supreme Court of Hong Kong / China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corporation Shenzhen Branch v. Gee Tai Holdings Co Ltd / 1992 No. MP 2411
Country Hong Kong Court Hong Kong, High Court, In the Supreme Court of Hong Kong Date 13 July 1994 Parties China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corporation Shenzhen Branch v. Gee Tai Holdings Co Ltd Case number 1992 No. MP 2411 Applicable NYC Provisions V | II Source [1995] 2 HKLR 215 | http://www.judiciary.gov.hk (website of the Judiciary of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China)
Languages English Summary The plaintiff (“China Nanhai”, a company incorporated in China) and the defendant (“Gee Tai”, a company incorporated in Hong Kong) entered into a contract which provided for arbitration under the auspices of the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”). At the time the contract was concluded, the CIETAC Rules provided that “the Arbitration Commission is located in Beijing”. A dispute arose between the parties and China Nanhai applied to the Shezhen branch of the CIETAC to initiate an arbitration proceeding. Gee Tai defaulted in appointing an arbitrator and the CIETAC appointed an arbitrator for it. Counsel for Gee Tai argued that the Shezhen branch did not have jurisdiction to hear the dispute because according to the CIETAC Rules at the time of the parties’ agreement the Arbitration Commission was located in Beijing alone. Gee Tai put this objection to the Shezhen branch, which overruled it. From that point onwards both the plaintiff and the defendant in the original proceeding took part in the arbitration without making any “without prejudice” claims. An award was rendered against Gee Tai, which China Nanhai sought to enforce in Hong Kong. Gee Tai resisted the award’s enforcement arguing that the composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties. In making that argument, Gee Tai relied on Section 44(2)(e) of Hong Kong’s Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 341) (the “Ordinance”) (mirroring Article V(1)(d) NYC). The High Court refused to stay the enforcement of the arbitral award, finding that although the Shezhen branch did not have jurisdiction over the dispute on the basis of the parties’ contract, Gee Tai had participated in the arbitration without reserving its rights and without continuing to contest the Shezhen branch’s jurisdiction. Kaplan J found that Gee Tai was therefore estopped from challenging the branch’s jurisdiction at the enforcement stage. The judge remarked that the principle of estoppel applied to Article II NYC and, consequently, the judge saw no reason as to why it should not apply to other articles of the NYC. Finally, the judge held as obiter that even if the lack of jurisdiction had constituted a ground for the refusal of the enforcement, he would still have exercised his discretion so as to enforce the award. see also : Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=947&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country France Court France, Cour de cassation (French Court of Cassation) Date 23 March 1994 Parties Société Hilmarton Ltd v. Société Omnium de traitement et de valorisation (OTV) Case number 92-15.137 Applicable NYC Provisions V | V(1) | V(1)(e) | VII | VII(1) Source Bulletin 1994 I N° 104 p. 79, Original decision obtained from the registry of the Cour de cassation
Summary A French company (Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation - OTV) entrusted an English company (Hilmarton) with the task of providing advise and coordination for a bid to obtain and perform a contract for works in Algeria. Hilmarton relied on the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration agreement in order to obtain payment of the remaining balance of its fees. The award rendered in Geneva on 19 August 1988 dismissed this claim. The award was declared enforceable in France even though it had been set aside in Switzerland. Hilmarton challenged the decision of the Cour d'appel de Paris (Paris Court of Appeal) which upheld the enforcement order. It contended that, pursuant to Article V(1)(e) NYC, the recognition and enforcement should have been refused since it has been set aside in Switzerland. It argued further that the Cour d'appel de Paris also violated Articles 1498 and 1502 5° of the Code of Civil Procedure by granting effect to an award which had no legal existence since it had been set aside. The Cour de cassation (Supreme Court) affirmed the decision of the Cour d'appel de Paris and dismissed the action. Pursuant to Article VII NYC, it found that the Cour d'appel de Paris rightly held that OTV could avail itself of French rules pertaining to the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards in international arbitration and notably Article 1502 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which does not include the same ground for refusal of recognition and enforcement of awards as set forth in Article V(1)(e) NYC. The Cour de cassation added that the award rendered in Switzerland was an international award which was not integrated into the legal order of that State and therefore continues to exist notwithstanding the notion that it had been set aside and its recognition in France was not contrary to international public policy. affirms : Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=140&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country France Court France, Cour d'appel de Paris (Court of Appeal of Paris) Date 24 February 1994 Parties Ministère tunisien de l'Equipement v. Société Bec Frères and Société Grands Travaux d'Afrique Case number 92.23638 & 92.23639 Applicable NYC Provisions V | V(1) | VII | VII(1) Source Original decision obtained from the registry of the Cour d’appel de Paris
Summary In response to the Ministry of Equipment of the Republic of Tunisia's two calls for tender regarding the construction of two road segments, a French company (Bec Frères) and a Tunisian company (Grands Travaux d'Afrique) - which had formed a group of companies for the purpose of conducting the works jointly - submitted a joint bid for each segments. The Ministry awarded the group both contracts and entered into two agreements with the group, which contained an arbitration agreement. Difficulties arose between the parties during the course of the construction works, which resulted in the termination of the two agreements. Arbitration proceedings were initiated and awards were rendered on 8 February 1990 and 13 September 1990 in favor of the group. In two orders issued on 15 April 1991, the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (First Instance Court of Paris) allowed enforcement of the two awards in France. Appealing these decisions, the Ministry relied on (i) the jurisdictional immunity of the State, (ii) the administrative nature of the contracts and the domestic nature of the awards subject to Tunisian law, (iii) the res judicata effect of decisions rendered by Tunisian courts which annulled the arbitration agreement, and (iv) Article V(1) NYC. In addition, it contented that the arbitral tribunal had ruled upon the matter without an arbitration agreement or on the basis of a void and lapsed agreement (Article 1502 1° of the Code of Civil Procedure), the arbitral tribunal was not properly constituted (Article 1502 2°) and due process was violated (Article 1502 3°). The Cour d'appel de Paris (Paris Court of Appeal) confirmed the enforcement orders and dismissed the appeal. It first reasoned that the underlying awards were international awards since the transaction entailed a cross-border transfer of material, a transfer of know-how and a cross-border payment. Given that the Ministry of Equipment relied on Article V(1) NYC and Article 1502 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Cour d'appel de Paris noted that, pursuant to Article VII NYC (ratified by both France and Tunisia), the provisions of the NYC do not deprive either party of the right to avail itself of an award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or Treaties of the country where such award is sought to be relied upon. Consequently, it held that a French court cannot refuse enforcement when its domestic law would allow it and must, ex officio, ascertain whether this is the case. It thus decided to rule in light of the provisions of Article 1502 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, on this basis, rejected each claim. Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=139&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country Benin | OHADA Court Benin, Tribunal de Première Instance de Cotonou Date 25 January 1994 Parties M. Adeossi v Sonapra Case number Ordonnance n°19/94 Applicable NYC Provisions V | V(1)(b) Source OHADATA J-08-176
Languages English Summary An arbitral award was rendered in the Havre (France) on 20 December 1993. Mr. Adeossi requested the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award in Benin. The Tribunal de Première Instance de Cotonou (Cotonou First Instance Tribunal) refused to enforce the arbitral award. It reasoned that the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards were governed by the NYC (ratified by Benin in 1974) and the Code of Civil Procedure, and verified whether the conditions provided in Article V NYC and Article 1030 of the Code of Civil Procedure were fulfilled, inter alia (i) the regularity of the foreign decision (formal requirement), (ii) whether the respondents were able to participate in the proceeding, (iii) whether the delays had been complied with, (iv) whether due process had been violated, (v) whether the arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the dispute, and (vi) whether the award was contrary to domestic public policy. In the case at hand, the Tribunal de Première Instance de Cotonou held that due process had been violated. In this respect, it noted that after the date of closing of the proceeding, both parties had filed supplemental briefs and that, although the brief submitted by SONAPRA had been declared inadmissible, the arbitral tribunal had relied on various arguments raised by Mr. Adeossi in his final brief submitted after SONAPRA's submission which had been refused. Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=540&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country Austria Court Austria, Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) Date 20 October 1993 Parties K**** GmbH v. D**** Case number 3Ob117/93 Applicable NYC Provisions V | V(1) | V(1)(e) Source Languages German Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=3896&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country India Court India, High Court of Delhi Date 15 October 1993 Parties Gas Authority of India Ltd v. SPIE-CAPAG SA and ors Case number Suit No. 1440; IA No. 5206 Applicable NYC Provisions I | II | II(3) | V | V(1) | V(1)(a) Source AIR 1994 Delhi 75; 1993 (27) DRJ 562; ILR 1994 Delhi 131 | http://www.indiankanoon.org (website of decisions of the Supreme Court as well as several High Courts)
Languages English Summary Gas Authority of India Ltd (“GAIL”) entered into a contract with the respondents for the construction of a gas pipeline, which provided for arbitration under the auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) in New Delhi, India. A dispute arose and the respondents initiated arbitral proceedings, seeking a declaration that GAIL was not entitled to liquidated damages as provided by the contract. GAIL launched a legal action before the High Court of Delhi, arguing that the commencement of the arbitration was invalid and violated the contract between the parties, and that the matter was not referable to arbitration. The respondents argued that Section 3 of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act 1961 (the “1961 Act”) (mirroring Article II(3) NYC) was applicable in the present case, requiring the Indian courts to stay the suit filed by GAIL. The High Court of Delhi found for the respondents, ordering a stay of the suit filed before it in favour of the arbitral proceeding. According to the Court, Section 3 of the 1961 Act was applicable to the present dispute even though the arbitration agreement was one for arbitration in India. In the Court’s view, nothing in the wording of Section 3 – which the Court expressly considered to reflect Article II(3) NYC – mandated that a stay should only be granted if the arbitration agreement was for arbitration outside India. The Court stressed that the limited situations where a court could refuse to refer a matter to arbitration, such as the invalidity of the arbitration agreement, were exhaustively enumerated in Section 3 of the 1961 Act. The High Court considered that Section 3 would apply to any arbitration agreement “with a foreign element or flavour involving international trade and commerce even though such an agreement does not lead to a foreign award”. In this case, the Court pointed out, the respondents who were parties to the arbitration agreement had their places of business outside India, a fact which meant that the 1961 Act and the NYC “undoubtedly […] apply to the arbitration agreement”. In arriving at this conclusion, the High Court remarked that “the object of the [1961 Act] was to give legislative recognition to the New York Convention” and stressed that it had no discretion, once it decided that Section 3 of the 1961 Act was applicable, but to refer the dispute to arbitration. The Court also noted that Section 7 of the 1961 Act mirrors Article V NYC and, in particular, that Sections 7(1)(a)(i) and 7(i)(b) of the 1961 Act mirror Articles V(1)(a) and V(2)(b) NYC. According to the Court, Sections 3 and 7 demonstrate that questions of existence, validity and scope of an arbitration agreement fall to be decided by the court and, with respect to Section 7, even after the award is made and filed but before it is made enforceable. see also :
- 1. INTRODUCTION (II) / §6
- 1. INTRODUCTION (I) / §2
- I / 2. ANALYSIS (I) / ARTICLE I(3) / a.The territorial criterion and the reciprocity reservation / §72
- I / 2. ANALYSIS (I) / ARTICLE I(3) / a.The territorial criterion and the reciprocity reservation / §73
- I / 2. ANALYSIS (I) / ARTICLE I(3) / b. Meaning of “whether contractual or not” / §90
- II / 2. ANALYSIS (II) / ARTICLE II(3) / b. Courts' review of the existence and validity of an 'agreement in writing' / §101
- II / 2. ANALYSIS (II) / B. Meaning of 'agreement' / §21
Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=1367&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country India Court India, Supreme Court Date 12 October 1993 Parties Brace Transport Corporation of Monrovia, Bermuda v. Orient Middle East Lines Ltd and ors Case number Civil Appeals Nos 5438-39 of 1993 Applicable NYC Provisions I | II | III | IV | V Source http://www.spotlaw.in (website of decisions of the Supreme Court as well as several High Courts)
Languages English Summary Brace Transport Corporation (“Brace”) entered into a contract with the second respondent (“Orri”) for the sale of a vessel. Orri nominated the first respondent (“Orient”) to purchase the vessel. A dispute arose and the matter was referred to arbitration, where an award was rendered in favour of Brace. After the award was rendered, Brace found out that the vessel had been sold to the third respondent, a company owned by the Indian Government, although the third respondent had yet to pay Orient and Orri. In the meantime, the third respondent sold the vessel to the fourth respondent to break it up: the vessel was situated in India. Brace applied to the Bhavnagar Court, in Gujarat, India, to enforce the award against the vessel, beached in India. The Bhavnagar Court found for Brace but its decision was overturned on appeal to the High Court of Gujarat. Brace appealed the decision of the High Court of Gujarat before the Supreme Court of India. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the award could be enforced against the proceeds of sale which had not yet been paid by the third respondent to Orri and Orient. However, the Supreme Court made clear that the Bhavnagar Court had no jurisdiction to enforce a maritime lien, even if such a lien existed, as the vessel was no longer an asset of either Orri or Orient. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court referred to the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act 1961 (the “1961 Act”), stating that the 1961 Act was “placed on the statute book to enable effect to be given to the [NYC]”. Commenting on Section 2 (incorporating, in modified language, Articles I and II NYC), the Court held that a condition for an award to fall within the auspices of the 1961 Act as a “foreign award” is that the award is made in a territory which Central Government of India has notified in the Official Gazette to be a territory applying the NYC. The Court also reviewed the other provisions of the NYC, noting that Section 3 refers to Article II NYC which provides for the stay of a legal action in favour of arbitration. After reviewing the content of Articles I(1), II, III, IV and V NYC, the Court noted that the NYC speaks of “recognition and enforcement” of an award. According to the Court, an award may be recognised but not enforced, enforcement involving the use of “legal sanctions to ensure that [the award] is carried out”. reverses : see also : Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=1381&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country India Court India, Supreme Court Date 12 October 1993 Parties Brace Transport Corporation Of Monrovia (Liberia) v Orient Middle - East Lines Ld. (Saudi Arabia) Case number AIR 1994 SC 1715 Applicable NYC Provisions I | II | III | IV | V Source http://www.indiankanoon.org (website of decisions of the Supreme Court as well as several High Courts)
Languages English Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=440&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
Q13_-_Brace_Transport_of_Monrovia_v_Oriental_Middle_-_east_lines.pdfAdobe Acrobat PDF
Country India Court India, Supreme Court Date 07 October 1993 Parties Renusagar Power Co Ltd v. General Electric Company and anor. Applicable NYC Provisions V | V(2) | V(2)(b) Source (1994) 2 Arb LR 405: AIR 1994 SC 860, 885, 888: 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644 | http://www.judis.nic.in (website of the decisions of the Supreme Court as well as several High Courts)
Languages English Summary Renusagar Power Co Ltd (“Renusagar”) entered into a contract General Electric Company (“General Electric”), which provided for arbitration under the auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) in Paris. A dispute arose and General Electric referred the matter to arbitration. Renusagar argued that the dispute did not fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement but the Supreme Court of India ruled against it. An award was rendered in favour of General Electric which it sought to enforce before the High Court of Bombay. The High Court enforced the award and Renusagar appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that (i) the arbitral tribunal had failed to inform it of the potential effects of certain of the Tribunal's decisions, thereby rendering it unable to present its case in violation of Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act 1961 (the “1961 Act”) (mirroring Article V(1)(b) NYC); and, (ii) the terms of the award were grossly unfair, so enforcement would be contrary to public policy, in violation of Section 7(b)(ii) of the 1961 Act (mirroring Article V(2)(b) NYC). The Supreme Court dismissed Renusagar’s appeal and affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court rejected Renusagar’s contention that it had been unable to present its case in violation of Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the 1961 Act because Renusagar voluntarily refused to appear before the arbitral tribunal. Therefore, it could not complain of the alleged effects this had on presentation of its case at this stage in the proceedings. The Court also rejected Renusagar’s public policy argument. First, it held that the term “public policy” in Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the 1961 Act referred to the public policy of India and not the public policy of New York. It based this conclusion on Article V(2)(b) NYC, which it found to clearly refer to the public policy of the country enforcing the award. Second, it held that the award was not contrary to the public policy of India. The Court determined that under Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the 1961 Act, the enforcement an award violates the public policy of India if enforcement would be contrary to (i) a fundamental policy of Indian law; (ii) the interests of India; or, (iii) justice or morality. The Court found that no aspect of the award or interest was excessive or unjust, and therefore enforcing the award would not be contrary to India's public policy. see also :
- V(2) / V(2)(b) / 2. ANALYSIS (V(2)(b)) / b. International – transnational public policy / §14
- V(2) / V(2)(b) / 2. ANALYSIS (V(2)(b)) / a. The public policy exception under the Convention / §11
- India / 11 August 1987 / India, Supreme Court / Renusagar Power Co Ltd v. General Electric Company and anor. / Civil Appeal No. 2319 of 1986
- V(2) / V(2)(b) / 2. ANALYSIS (V(2)(b)) / b. International – transnational public policy / §13
- V(2) / V(2)(b) / 2. ANALYSIS (V(2)(b)) / a. The public policy exception under the Convention / §5
Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=411&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country Hong Kong Court Hong Kong, High Court, In the Supreme Court of Hong Kong Date 06 October 1993 Parties Safond Shipping Sdn Bhd v. East Asia Sawmill Corp. Case number HCMP 2635/1993 Applicable NYC Provisions V(1) | V | V(1)(d) Source http://www.judiciary.gov.hk (website of the Judiciary of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China)
Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=4524&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country France Court France, Cour de cassation (French Court of Cassation) Date 10 March 1993 Parties Société Polish Ocean Line v. Société Jolasry Case number 91-16.041 Applicable NYC Provisions V | V(1) | V(1)(e) | VII | VII(1) Source Bulletin 1993 I N° 99 p. 66, Original decision obtained from the registry of the Cour de cassation
Summary On 13 August 1988, a Polish company (Polish Ocean Line - POL) entered into a representation agreement with a French company (Jolasry) containing an arbitration agreement. An arbitral award was rendered in Gdansk on 17 March 1990 in favor of Jolasry. On 12 April 1990, POL commenced an action to set aside the award before the Economic Court of Gdansk, which suspended the enforcement of the award on 22 May 1990. In the meantime, the award was declared enforceable in France on 30 April 1990. POL challenged the decision of the Cour d'appel de Douai (Douai Court of Appeal) dated 18 April 1991 which upheld the enforcement order on the ground that, in light of the pending action in Poland and the decision rendered by the Court of Gdansk, the refusal to suspend enforcement of the award in France was contrary to Articles 1498 and 1502 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Cour de cassation (Supreme Court) affirmed the decision of the Cour d'appel de Douai and dismissed the action. It reasoned that Article VII NYC provides that the provisions of the NYC (to which France and Poland are parties) may not deprive a party of any right to avail itself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of the country where such award is sought to be relied upon. It then held that French courts may only refuse enforcement in the limited number of situations listed in Article 1502 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which does not include the ground set forth in Article V(1)(e) NYC (i.e. where the award is either set aside or suspended in the country where it was rendered). It thus concluded that the Cour d'appel de Douai rightly found that the action to set aside the award in Poland and the suspension of enforcement of the award obtained in Poland could not justify a refusal to enforce the award in France. Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=136&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country France Court France, Cour d'appel de Paris (Court of Appeal of Paris) Date 12 February 1993 Parties Société Unichips Finanziaria SpA and Société Unichips International BV v. Consorts Gesnouin Case number 92-14017 Applicable NYC Provisions V | V(1) | V(1)(b) | V(1)(c) | V(2) | V(2)(b) | VII | VII(1) Source Original decision obtained from the registry of the Cour d’appel de Paris
Summary On 25 February 1988, two individuals sold their shares in various companies of the Gesnouin Group to an Italian company (Unichips). A dispute arose and the two individuals commenced arbitration against Unichips. An award was rendered on 18 and 27 December 1990 in their favor. On 1 July 1991, the Swiss Federal Court rejected Unichips' action to set aside the award. In an order issued on 19 February 1992, the President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (First Instance Court of Paris) allowed enforcement of the award in France. Appealing this decision, Unichips argued that (i) the arbitral tribunal ruled without complying with the mandate conferred upon it (Article 1502 3° of the Code of Civil Procedure), (ii) due process was violated (Article 1502 4°), and (iii) the award was contrary to international public policy (Article 1502 5°). The two individuals contented that French courts were bound by the decision of the Swiss Federal Court and thus could not control the international validity of the award. The Cour d'appel de Paris (Paris Court of Appeal) upheld the enforcement order and dismissed the appeal. It first reasoned that the enforcement of an international award is subject to enforcement procedures in accordance with the conditions set forth in the NYC and under French law. It then held that the decision of the Swiss Federal Court dismissing the action to set aside the award does not deprive French courts from controlling the international validity of an award in order to allow its integration in the French legal order, whether this control is made with regard to the NYC or French law. It thus declared the appeal of the enforcement order admissible, while noting that pursuant to Article VII NYC, if the requirements for the recognition and enforcement of an award under French law are less strict than that of the NYC, the former shall prevail. The Cour d'appel de Paris then dismissed Unichips' arguments based on Article V NYC and Article 1502 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As to the violation of due process, it noted that Article V(1)(b) NYC and Article 1502 4° of the Code of Civil Procedure have the same purpose and are similar in their content and scope. It noted further, regarding the violation of international public policy, that the provisions of Article V(2)(b) and Article 1502 5° of the Code of Civil Procedure are identical. see also : Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=135&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country United States Court United States, U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit Date 24 November 1992 Parties Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp. Case number 92-7217 Applicable NYC Provisions V | V(1)(b) Languages English Summary Avco Corporation (“Avco”) entered into series of contracts with Iran Aircraft Industries for the repair and replacement of helicopter engines. A dispute arose and was submitted by the parties to the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. By an award dated 18 July 1988, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal denied Avco’s claims. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut refused to enforce the award. Iran Aircraft Industries appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the order of the District Court denying enforcement of the award. In so ruling, it found that the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal’s awards are not “directly” enforceable in the United States courts and are subject to the defenses to enforcement provided in the NYC. The Court then held that Avco had been “unable to present [its] case” within the meaning of Article V(1)(b) NYC. The Court determined that the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal had denied Avco the opportunity to present its claim in a meaningful manner because one of the judges had approved a method of proof proposed by Avco (submission of Avco’s audited accounts receivable ledgers) which was later questioned by another judge, who requested the actual invoices to substantiate Avco’s claim. The Court of Appeals thus concluded that Avco was misled regarding the evidence it was required to submit, and was thus deprived of the possibility to present its case. Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=1148&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country Finland Court Finland, Supreme Court Date 09 September 1992 Parties Mr. Reijo Harnos and Mr. Lauri Silanterä/estate of Mr. Tauno Silanterä Case number S91/1064 Applicable NYC Provisions V | V(1)(c) Source www.finlex.fi Languages English Summary Tauno Silanterä had purchased diamonds from Reijo Harnos pursuant to three Sales Agreements, which included non-disclosure provisions, and arbitration agreements referring disputes to be resolved by arbitration in Hamburg, West Germany. A dispute arose following the death of Tauno Silanterä, when his son, Lauri Silanterä, sought to avoid the contracts in the District Court of Helsinki, seeking interim measures and claiming that Reijo Harnos had not entered into the agreements in good faith. The District Court granted interim measures against Reijo Harnos, but the main claim was later rejected. Reijo Harnos commenced an arbitration against Lauri Silanterä claiming damages on the grounds of breach of the non-disclosure agreement and harm caused by the interim measures. An award was rendered on 22 July 1990 in West Germany in favor of Reijo Harnos, who sought enforcement in Finland. Lauri Silanterä objected to the enforcement of the award on the grounds that the jurisdiction of the tribunal was limited to the disputes arising out of the Sales Agreements entered into between Reijo Harnos and his father Tauno Silanterä. He argued that the issues regarding damages arising from the interim measures and harm to Reijo Harnos’ reputation did not fall within the scope of the arbitration clauses contained in the Sales Agreements, and that the dispute was not between the parties to those arbitration clauses. Turun ja Porin lääninhallitus (State Provincial Office of Turku and Pori) held that the award should be enforced in Finland, because the arbitral tribunal had assumed jurisdiction over the disputed issues and because Lauri Silanterä had not provided any evidence that the enforcement should be rejected pursuant to Article V NYC. Upon appeal by Lauri Silanterä, Turun hovioikeus (Turku Court of Appeals) rejected the action for enforcement under Article V(1)(c) NYC, reasoning that the claimed damages for the harm caused by the interim measures did not fall within the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. Reijo Harnos appealed. Korkein oikeus (Supreme Court of Finland) overruled the decision by reasoning that the party founding their objection on Article V(1)(c) NYC needs to prove that the award governs an issue outside the scope of the arbitration agreement, which it concluded was not the case in the dispute in question. Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=1562&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country Hong Kong Court Hong Kong, High Court, In the Supreme Court of Hong Kong Date 12 August 1992 Parties J. J. Agro Industries (P) Ltd. v. Texuna International Ltd. Case number HCMP000751/1992 Applicable NYC Provisions V | V(1)(c) Source http://www.judiciary.gov.hk (website of the Judiciary of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China)
Languages English Summary Two Indian companies, the plaintiff (“Agro”) and the defendant (“Texuna”), entered into a contract for the sale of goods which provided for arbitration. Agro had paid a deposit to Texuna, as required by the contract, but Texuna had failed to deliver the goods and Agro initiated an arbitral proceeding. Texuna argued that Agro had abducted a key witness of Texuna and had forced him to retract a favourable affidavit he had given for Texuna, as well as to present a false affidavit. This carried particular weight, according to Texuna, because this witness’ testimony was relevant to whether Agro had mitigated its losses, something which Texuna contended Agro had failed to do. An award was rendered in favour of Agro on both the delivery of goods and the return of the deposit. Agro sought to enforce in Hong Kong the part of the award concerning the return of the deposit. Texuna resisted the award’s enforcement relying on the alleged abduction of its key witness. In making this argument, Texuna relied on Section 44(3) of Hong Kong’s Arbitration Ordinance 2000 (Cap. 341) (the “Ordinance”) (mirroring Article V(2) NYC). The High Court refused to grant a stay of the enforcement of the part of the award concerning the return of the deposit, holding that the argument concerning the abduction of the witness did not relate to the issue of the return of the deposit, as the witness had offered no contrary testimony on point. According to the judge, an award could be enforced in part both under common law and the NYC: the judge reasoned that if an argument rendered the enforcement of part of an award contrary to public policy, this did not taint the entire award. In the judge’s view, the fact that Section 44(4) of the Ordinance did not refer to the possibility of enforcing an award only in part was not indicative of the lack of a court’s power to enforce only part of an award. The judge noted that Section 44(4) of the Ordinance reflects the part of Article V(1)(c) NYC concerning the enforcement of “matters submitted to arbitration [that] can be separated from those not so submitted”. Kaplan J, in an obiter remark, also noted that Section 44(3) (mirroring Article V(2) NYC) replicated a ground set out in the NYC. Further, the judge held that if Texuna had been able to establish its allegation on the facts, this would have satisfied Section 44(3), which could have resulted to a possible stay of the award’s enforcement. see also : Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=964&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country United States Court United States, U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit Date 30 June 1992 Parties Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, Inc.; Gould Marketing, Inc.; Hoffman Export Corporation; Gould International, Inc. Case number 91-55135 / 91-55136 Applicable NYC Provisions V | V(1)(c) Languages English Summary The Government of Iran entered into an agreement with Hoffman Export Corporation (“Hoffman”), an American corporation, for the sale of military equipment to Iran. A dispute arose and arbitration was commenced before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal pursuant to Article II of the Claims Settlement Declaration, which established the Tribunal. During the arbitral proceedings, Hoffman was merged into Gould Marketing, Inc. (“GMI”). The Tribunal ruled in favor of Iran and ordered GMI to pay certain sums to Iran and “to make available to Iran” certain communications equipment in possession of GMI. Iran sought confirmation and enforcement of the award in the United States federal courts. The District Court confirmed the monetary portion of the award, but modified the specific performance portion of the award. GMI appealed, arguing that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction in rendering an award. Both parties appealed the Court’s order modifying the specific performance portion of the award. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit confirmed the monetary portion of the award and vacated the part of the award which ordered GMI to make available certain equipment. In so ruling, the Court of Appeals expressed no views as to whether the District Court’s action concerning specific performance of the award was allowed under the NYC. It rejected GMI’s argument that the award should not be enforced pursuant to Article V(1)(c) NYC because it exceeded the scope of the parties’ pleadings. It stated that the award dealt with a “difference falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration” and found that under the NYC, it could only examine whether the award exceeded the scope of the Claims Settlement Declaration and not whether the award exceeded the scope of the parties’ pleadings. see also : Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=1149&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country Austria Court Austria, Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) Date 25 June 1992 Parties **** Corporation, **** Seoul, Korea v. S**** Establishment for Commerce, **** Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, et al. Case number 7Ob545/92 Applicable NYC Provisions I | I(1) | V | V(1) | V(1)(e) Source Languages German Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=3897&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country Switzerland Court Switzerland, Tribunal fédéral (Federal Tribunal) Date 23 June 1992 Parties Fincantieri Cantieri Navali Italiani SpA et OTO Melara Spa v. ATF Applicable NYC Provisions V Source http://www.bger.ch (website of Swiss Federal Tribunal)
Languages English Summary Fincantieri Cantieri Navali Italiani and OTO Melara, two companies registered in Italy, entered into an agency agreement with M for the conclusion of contracts with the Republic of Iraq. Subsequently, a dispute arose and on 4 December 1989, M initiated arbitration proceedings under the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). By interim award rendered in Geneva on 25 November 1991, the arbitral tribunal held that it had jurisdiction. The two Italian companies lodged a public law appeal against the award. They argued that the subject matter of the dispute was not capable of settlement by arbitration because of the commercial embargo put in place by the United Nations against Iraq. The Italian companies also requested that the award be set aside because, pursuant to Article V(2) NYC, as it will not be enforceable in other jurisdictions. The Tribunal Fédéral (Federal Tribunal) dismissed the request. The Tribunal Fédéral ruled that the dispute was capable of settlement by arbitration under Swiss law. Regarding the argument that the award should be set aside as it would not be able to be enforced abroad pursuant to Article V(2) NYC, the Tribunal Fédéral considered that the fact that an award rendered in Switzerland might be unenforceable in other countries was not a valid reason to have it set aside. Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=910&opac_view=6 Attachment (2)
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Country India Court India, Supreme Court Date 07 May 1992 Parties National Thermal Power Corp v. Singer Company and others Applicable NYC Provisions V Source http://www.indiankanoon.org (website of decisions of the Supreme Court as well as several High Courts)
Languages English Summary National Thermal Power Corporation (“National”) entered in two contracts with the respondent Singer Company (“Singer”) for the supply of equipment and commissioning of certain works in India, each contract providing that any dispute shall be resolved as set out in the General Terms and Conditions. The General Terms and Conditions provided that Austrian law governed the contracts and that any dispute between the parties be resolved under the auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”). A dispute arose which was referred to arbitration under the ICC Rules. As the parties had not agreed to a seat for the arbitral tribunal, the ICC Court decided that the arbitration would have its seat in London. An interim award was rendered which National sought to set aside in India. The High Court in Delhi rejected National’s application on the basis that the award was a foreign award to which the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act 1961 (the “1961 Act”) applied and, consequently, the Indian courts had no jurisdiction to set aside the award. National appealed the High Court’s decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, reversing the decision of the High Court and ordering the High Court to consider National’s application on the merits. The Supreme Court held that Indian law governed the arbitration agreement, with the consequence that the Act was inapplicable. According to the Supreme Court, a “foreign award” to which the Act applies must meet the requirements of Section 2 of the 1961 Act (implementing Articles I and II NYC), as well as the requirements of Section 9 of the 1961 Act. According to Section 9 the 1961 Act does not apply to awards made pursuant to arbitration agreements governed by Indian law. In this case the Supreme Court’s conclusion was that Indian law governed the arbitration agreement. As such, the 1961 Act was inapplicable, with the result that Arbitration Act 1940, applied, under which the High Court did have the power to set the award aside. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court remarked that Section 7 of the 1961 Act is “in consonance with” Article V NYC, with the result that a “foreign award” would be enforced in India as if it were an award made on a matter referred to arbitration in India, considering that. Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=1396&opac_view=6 Attachment (2)
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Country Korea Court Korea, Seoul Civil District Court Date 01 May 1992 Parties Gwangzhou Ocean Shipping Company v. Eagle Merchant Marine Co., Ltd. Case number 91Gahap45511 Applicable NYC Provisions II | IV | IV(1) | V | V(1) | V(1)(b) Source Languages Korean Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=6439&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country Switzerland Court Switzerland, Tribunal fédéral (Federal Tribunal) Date 11 March 1992 Parties P. v. Société S. Applicable NYC Provisions V | V(2) | V(2)(b) Source http://www.bger.ch (website of Swiss Federal Tribunal)
Languages French Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=6293&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country Canada Court Canada, Ontario Court (General Division) Date 13 February 1992 Parties Schreter v. Gasmac Applicable NYC Provisions V | V(2) | V(2)(b) Source [1992] O.J. No. 257 | online: CanLII
Languages English Summary In 1987, Schreter entered into a sales contract with Gasmac Inc. (“Gasmac”) which contained an arbitration clause providing for the resolution of all disputes arising under the contract through arbitration in Atlanta, Georgia, under the rules of the American Arbitration Association. Schreter initiated arbitration proceedings against Gasmac in 1989 for breach of contract and obtained a favourable award. Schreter applied to enforce the award in Ontario. Gasmac opposed the enforcement, claiming that the arbitrator’s award granting accelerated damages violated public policy in Ontario. The Ontario Court granted enforcement of the award, finding that its enforcement would not violate public policy. Although its decision was based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (the “UNCITRAL Model Law”), it referred to the scope of the “public policy” exception under Article V(2)(b) NYC. The Court reasoned that the purpose of imposing the public policy of a province or state on foreign awards was to safeguard against the enforcement of an award which offended fundamental notions and principles of justice. The Court noted that this could not warrant the reopening of the merits of an arbitral decision and that such an action could bring the enforcement procedure of the UNCITRAL Model Law into disrepute. The Court found that in the present case, Gasmac had had a full hearing and made arguments during the arbitral proceedings, and that the award of accelerated damages would not violate public policy in Ontario. see also : Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=904&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country Egypt Court Egypt, Court of Cassation Date 23 December 1991 Parties Misr Insurance Company v. Alexandria Shipping Agencies Company Case number 547/51 Applicable NYC Provisions V | II | V(1)(a) Languages English Summary Nasr Company for Import and Export (“Nasr”) shipped a message on board a ship owned by the Alexandria Shipping Agencies Company (“Alexandria Shipping”). Upon delivery at the port of Alexandria, damage to the message was noticed. Following the transfer of Nasr’s rights vis-à-vis Alexandria Shipping to Misr Insurance Company (“Misr Insurance”), the latter filed a lawsuit claiming compensation of the damage suffered. On 30 June 1979, the Alexandria Court of First Instance dismissed Misr Insurance’s claim given the existence of an arbitration agreement in the bill of lading, requiring resolution of disputes by arbitration in Gothenburg, Sweden. On 27 December 1980, the Alexandria Court of Appeal confirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance. On 22 February 1981, Misr Insurance challenged the judgment of the Court of Appeal before the Court of Cassation and argued that Egyptian Courts had jurisdiction over the dispute because the arbitration agreement contained in the bill of lading did not determine the names of the arbitrators, thereby breaching Article 502(3) of the Egyptian Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure (“Code of Procedure”). The Court of Cassation rejected Misr Insurance’s challenge. It noted that foreign arbitration agreements are recognized in Egypt following the accession to the NYC and its application by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 171/1959. The Court added that Articles II and V(2) NYC require the Courts of the contracting States to refer matters governed by an arbitration agreement to arbitration, unless the arbitration agreement is null and void, incapable of being performed or its subject-matter is not capable of settlement by arbitration or affects public policy. The validity and effects of arbitration agreements are to be determined in accordance with the law of the seat of arbitration, which is Swedish law in the present case, so long as the subject-matter of the arbitration does not contravene public policy and is capable of settlement by arbitration in Egypt pursuant to Articles II, V(1)(a) and V(2) NYC. The Court concluded that Misr Insurance had provided no evidence establishing that the arbitration agreement was null and void under Swedish law. It added that contravention of public policy in Egypt requires a contravention of the social, political, economic or moral foundations of the State, and that a contradiction with a legal text is not sufficient. The Court held that Article 502(3) of the Code of Procedure, which requires an arbitration agreement to determine the identity of the arbitrators, is a rule that is unrelated to public policy. see also : Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=384&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country France Court France, Cour d'appel de Paris (Court of Appeal of Paris) Date 19 December 1991 Parties Société Hilmarton Ldt v. Société Omnium de traitement et de valorisation (OTV) Case number 90-16778 Applicable NYC Provisions V | V(1) | V(1)(e) | VII | VII(1) Source Original decision obtained from the registry of the Cour d’appel de Paris
Summary A French company (Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation - OTV) entrusted an English company (Hilmarton) with the task of providing advise and coordination for a bid to obtain and perform a contract for works in Algeria. Hilmarton initiated an arbitration pursuant to the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration agreement in order to obtain payment of the remaining balance of its fees. The award rendered in Geneva on 19 August 1988 dismissed this claim. In an order issued on 27 February 1990, the President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (First Instance Court of Paris) allowed the enforcement of the award in France, even though it had been set aside in Switzerland. Appealing this decision, Hilmarton argued that the recognition and enforcement of an award in France set aside in the country where it was rendered is contrary to international public policy under Article 1502 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the NYC. The Cour d'appel de Paris (Paris Court of Appeal) confirmed the enforcement order and dismissed the appeal. It reasoned that, according to Article VII NYC, the provisions of the NYC may not deprive a party of any right it may have to avail itself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of the country where such award is sought to be relied upon. It thus ruled that a court may not refuse to enforce an award when its domestic law would allow it and should disregard the provision Article V(1)(e) NYC where the domestic law of the country where enforcement is sought would allow it. It then noted that the annulment of an award in the country where it was rendered does not constitute a ground for refusing enforcement listed under Article 1502 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As a result, the Cour d'appel de Paris held that, pursuant to Article VII NYC, OTV is entitled to avail itself of French rules on international arbitration in order to request the enforcement of the award in France and that, given that French law on international arbitration does not require French courts to take into consideration the decision to set aside the award in a foreign legal order, the incorporation in the French legal order of an international award set aside abroad is not contrary to international public policy under Article 1502 5° of the Code of Civil Procedure. affirmed by : Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=134&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country United States Court United States, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit Date 03 October 1991 Parties McDermott International, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters of London Case number No. 91-3568 Applicable NYC Provisions V | V(1)(e) Source 944 F.2d 1199 Languages English Summary The Plaintiff submitted a policy claim to which the Defendant denied coverage. The policy claim contained both a “service-of-suit” clause and an arbitration clause. The Plaintiff brought a suit in Louisiana state court seeking damages under the policy. The Defendant demanded that the Plaintiff submit the dispute to arbitration. The Plaintiff filed a separate petition asking the Louisiana court to declare that the parties were under no obligation to arbitrate their disputes. The Defendant removed both suits to federal district court pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which grants federal district courts removal jurisdiction over cases that relate to an arbitration agreement governed by the NYC. The District Court held that pursuant to the policy’s service-of-suit clause, the Defendant was entitled to choose the forum where the parties’ dispute regarding arbitration would be resolved and remanded the cases to Louisiana state court. The Plaintiff appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the District Court’s remand order because the Defendant had not explicitly waived the right of removal under Section 205 of the FAA. The Court of Appeals held that the right of removal under Section 205 of the FAA confers a waivable right to go before a federal forum for the resolution of disputes relating to an arbitration agreement. The Court reasoned that although Congress made it simple for defendants in cases falling under the NYC Convention to remove cases to federal court, such a privilege may be waived contractually. However, it found that the service-of suit clause did not explicitly waive the Defendant’s removal rights. Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=626&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country Hong Kong Court Hong Kong, High Court, In the Supreme Court of Hong Kong Date 23 August 1991 Parties Guangdong New Technology Import & Export Corp Jiangmen Branch [China] v. Chiu Shing T/A BC Property & Trading Co [HK] Case number Miscellaneous proceedings No 1625 of 1991 Applicable NYC Provisions V | IV | V(1)(d) | V(1)(b) | IV(1) Source [1991] 2 HKC 459 (HC)
Languages English Summary Pursuant to Section 44 of the Arbitration Ordinance (which implements Article V NYC), Plaintiff, Guangdong New Technology Import & export Corp. Jiangmen Branch (“Guangdong”), brought an action to enforce an arbitral award rendered in China. Defendant, Chiu Shing T/A BC Property & Trading Co. (Chiu Shing”), challenged enforcement on the grounds that: (1) Guangdong had not produced a “duly authenticated original award”; (2) Guangdong had not produced a “duly certified copy” of the original arbitration agreement; (3) it (Chiu Shing) received late notice of the arbitral proceedings; and (4) the composition of the arbitral tribunal was not in accordance with the parties agreement. The court found that the original award, accompanied by an affidavit affirming its authenticity was sufficient to meet the requirement set forth in the NYC and the domestic implementing legislation. The court also found that copies of a document containing an arbitration clause — which had been incorporated by reference into the parties’ contract—sufficiently depicted the “original arbitration agreement” required for enforcement of an arbitral award. In response to Chiu Shing’s contention that it received late notice of the arbitiral proceedings, the court pointed out that despite such late notice, Chiu Shing did have an opportunity to present its case to the arbitral tribunal. Finally, the court rejected Chiu Shing’s argument that the tribunal was improperly constituted because the parties had intended the “Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade” to resolve their dispute and the dispute was handled by the “China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission” instead—the court pointed out that the tribunal had clearly indicated in the award that it had recently changed its name from the former to the latter. For these reasons, the court granted leave for the award to be enforced in the same manner as a judgment of the court. see also : Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=486&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country Canada Court Canada, Court of Queen's Bench of New Brunswick Date 19 August 1991 Parties M.A. Industries, Inc. v. Maritime Battery Ltd. Case number F/M/48/91 Applicable NYC Provisions I | I(3) | II | II(1) | II(2) | III | IV | V | XIV Source 118 NBR (2d) 127 | online: CanLII
Languages English Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=5384&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country France Court France, Cour de cassation (French Court of Cassation) Date 11 June 1991 Parties Société JP. Beemsterboer BV v. Mme Alfred Hellec Case number 90-12.296 Applicable NYC Provisions V Source Registry of the Court
Languages French Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=5232&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country Austria Court Austria, Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) Date 22 May 1991 Parties E. S**** B.V., **** Niederlande v. W**** & Co GmbH KG Case number 3Ob73/91 Applicable NYC Provisions II | II(2) | V | V(1) | V(1)(a) Source Languages German Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=3898&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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Country China Court China, 广州海事法院 (Guangzhou Maritime Court) Date 17 October 1990 Parties Guangzhou Ocean Shipping Co., Ltd v. Marships of Connecticut Company Applicable NYC Provisions V Languages English Summary On 25 October, 7 November and 19 November 1988, Guangzhou Ocean Shipping Co., Ltd. (“Guangzhou Ocean Shipping”) entered into three charter-party agreements with Marships of Connecticut Company Limited (“Marships”) under which Guangzhou Ocean Shipping leased three shipping vessels to Marships. Marships failed to pay the freight dues. Guangzhou Ocean Shipping rescinded the three charter-party agreements and initiated ad hoc arbitration in London against Marships pursuant the arbitration clauses contained within the three charter-party agreements. Each party appointed an arbitrator that constituted the arbitral tribunal. On 7, 15 and 25 August 1989, three arbitral awards were rendered respectively in favour of Guangzhou Ocean Shipping. When Marships only effected partial satisfaction of the arbitral awards, Guangzhou Ocean Shipping applied on 6 July 1990 for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral awards before the Guangzhou Maritime Court (广州海事法院) in order to appropriate payment to a third company, China National Foreign Trade Corporation (“CNFTC”), owed to Marships. The Guangzhou Maritime Court opined that all three arbitral awards should be recognised and enforced. In particular, the court held that the application for recognition and enforcement had satisfied the necessary requirements and that there were no grounds for refusal under Article V NYC. In addition, the court found that the application for recognition and enforcement was filed within the required time limit prescribed under Chinese law. Accordingly, the appropriation of CNFTC’s payment to Marships could be regarded as property subject to enforcement. see also : Link to the record https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=1489&opac_view=6 Attachment (1)
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