Summary
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A Japanese company and two German companies entered into agreements allowing the German companies to use certain glass production technologies of the Japanese company and also regulating the three companies’ joint development of certain new technologies. The Japanese company subsequently initiated arbitration proceedings in Zurich, under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”), alleging that the German companies had made unauthorized use of the Japanese companies’ know-how. The arbitral tribunal issued, inter alia, an interim award which was partly in favour of the Japanese company and partly in favour of the German companies. The German companies sought, unsuccessfully, to annul the interim award before the Schweizer Bundesgericht (Swiss Federal Supreme Court), alleging that the interim award violated public policy. Subsequently, the parties turned to the Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court) Thüringen for the recognition and enforcement of those parts of the interim award which were favourable to each. With respect to the portions favourable to the Japanese company, the German companies opposed enforcement, contending that the relevant portions of the interim award violated public policy since the arbitral tribunal (i) had not considered the German companies’ substantive defences, or had considered them insufficiently at best, and (ii) had not examined, in sufficient detail, the possible violation of Article 81(2) EC in connection with German competition law.
The Oberlandesgericht declared the interim award enforceable. It clarified that the interim award was capable of being recognized and enforced since it contained binding determinations on the merits of the dispute and not just decisions on procedural questions which would not be capable of recognition and enforcement. The Oberlandesgericht also rejected the German companies’ objection under Article V(2)(b) NYC. It first noted that under the NYC foreign arbitral awards could generally not be reviewed on the merits, and that potential errors in a foreign arbitral award were generally to be accepted, as was the case in relation to errors in a foreign court judgment. According to the Oberlandesgericht, recognition and enforcement proceedings were only meant to prevent misapplication of arbitrators’ powers, and not to relegate arbitral tribunals to mere preliminary decision-makers. If a state allowed arbitration proceedings, it must also be willing to accept, short of a violation of public policy, arbitration awards which might violate mandatory law. The Oberlandesgericht clarified that not all provisions of mandatory law constituted public policy, rather, public policy comprised only those provisions of mandatory law which affected the foundations of public and economic life and basic ideas of justice, including basic rights under the German Constitution, good morals, all fundamental principles of German law, and basic guarantees of procedural justice, such as the right to be heard. The Oberlandesgericht found that the German companies had been accorded the right to be heard to a sufficient degree, as stated by the Schweizer Bundesgericht in its decision denying annulment. The Oberlandesgericht found that it could use the finding of the Schweizer Bundesgericht on on this issue since the scope and content of the right to be heard were identical under Swiss and German law. The Oberlandesgericht further stated that the Schweizer Bundesgericht’s conclusions were generally binding on the Oberlandesgericht and that it was not the function of the Oberlandesgericht to thwart them as long as they were not obviously false or deficient. Moreover, the Oberlandesgericht stated that the German companies’ allegations of a violation of EU competition law did not fall under public policy within the meaning of Article V NYC. It agreed with the arbitral tribunal that the license agreement between the parties did not fall within the ambit of EU competition law and did not, moreover, limit competition. The Oberlandesgericht finally noted that the arbitral tribunal’s findings in this respect were to be accepted and were not subject to a comprehensive review in light of the prohibition of a review on the merits.
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